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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the lasting impressions left by the 1999 World Trade
Organization (WTO) Ministerial meetings in Seattle is the sense that we are
entering a new era in international relations.' This was not just another
meeting of trade ministers. Congregated in Seattle was a bewildering array of
non-state actors vying for influence in what has become one of the world's
most powerful fora.2 While transnational corporations and civil society
organizations have long played an influential role in international affairs, the
events in Seattle reinforced a growing perception that these increasingly
formidable players are beginning to reshape the norms and procedures of
international relations, forcing the rules in this arena to change.3
Indeed the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994 (NAFTA)
4
provides two vivid illustrations of how international law is already changing
to reflect the growing power of transnational corporations and global civil
society.5 The first is NAFTA's investor-state claim process (Chapter 11 of
1. The at times circus-like atmosphere of Seattle sharply contrasted with the cloistered
ambience of the trade meetings that launched, in Punte del Este, the Uruguay Round in 1986. Recalls
Sylvia Ostry, then a Canadian trade negotiator, 'Taxes didn't arrive, and nor did our newspapers. It felt
like we were on Mars." The Battle in Seattle, EcONOMIsT, Nov. 27, 1999, at 21. Dr. Ostry has more
recently observed that "the late 1990s were probably a defining decade, perhaps a transition to a new
political economy of international policy-making." Sylvia Ostry, A Clarion Call to Whatever, LITERARY
REV. OF CAN., Summer 2001, at 5.
2. The WTO was created in 1994 to "oversee an integrated dispute settlement regime and to
undertake a pro-active trade policy surveillance role." See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE,
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 30 (1999). It performs this role with respect to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, and a variety
of other agreements to which WTO member states must subscribe.
3. For the purposes of this Article, I use the term "civil society" to encompass organizations
and associations that exist outside of the state and the market. This definition includes the full spectrum
of what would commonly considered to be "interest groups" including advocacy NGOs, charities and
other non-profits organizations, labor unions as well as professional and trade associations. In this paper,
I use the term "NGO" synonymously with "civil society organization" although I recognize that NGO is
often used in both broader and narrower senses. For instance, under Article 45 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, "NGO" is defined to include "any profit or non-profit group
not affiliated or directed by government." U.S.-Can.-Mex. North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. At the same time,
many use the term NGO in a much stricter fashion to denote cause-oriented advocacy groups. See Steve
Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and Global Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 183
(1997).
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
5. The term "global civil society" acquired currency in the early 1990s. See generally
MARTIN SHAw, GLOBAL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1994); Ronnie D. Lipschutz,
Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society, 21 MILLENNIUM 389 (1992);
TOWARDS A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (Michael Walzer ed., 1995). On the role of NGOs in global
governance and international relations generally, see 92 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING-
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ANNUAL: THE CHALLENGE OF NON-STATE ACTORS (1998),
particularly Steve Charnovitz, Learning from Early NGO Activity, at 338-41 [hereinafter Chamovitz,
NGO Activity] and Kathryn Sikkink, Nongovernmental Organizations and Transnational Issue Networks
in International Politics, at 413-15. See also 89 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING- AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ANNUAL: STRUCTURES OF WORLD ORDER (1995), particularly Martha
L. Schweitz, NGO participation in International Governance: the Question of Legitimacy, at 415-20;
James N. Rosenau, Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World, in RE-IMAGING POLITICAL
COMMUNITY (Daniele Archibugi, David Held & Martin K6hler, eds. 1998); NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET (Michael Edwards
& David Hulme eds., 1996). NGOs have long played an influential role in international relations. See
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NAFTA) that gives private investors the right to seek compensation directly
from a NAFTA party-government ("Party") for enacting certain measures that
adversely affect their investments in the host country. To date, NAFTA
remains the only multilateral trade agreement containing such protections
despite concerted efforts by various countries to secure approval for a similar
provision under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) (the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment
initiative of 1997-98).6 A second illustration is the citizen submission
procedure established under the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) also known as the NAFTA
"Environmental Side Agreement." 7  Under Articles 14 and 15 of this
Agreement, citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) gained the
right to complain to the NAAEC Secretariat that a Party has failed "to
effectively enforce" its environmental laws.
By explicitly recognizing and vesting new rights in non-state actors,
both processes raise provocative and timely questions about state sovereignty.
Throughout much of the 1990s, considerable academic and popular attention
focused on the supposed decline of the nation-state. 8 Proponents of this thesis
pointed to various challenges to state sovereignty including globalization, the
increasing power of supranational authorities, and the growing influence of
Chamovitz, supra note 3. While this participation once took place behind the scenes, it is increasingly
being given official status and explicit recognition in various international arenas. On the recognition of
the role of NGOs in international trade law, see Steve Chamovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental
Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON L. 331 (1996) [hereinafter
Chamovitz, Participation of NGOs in the WTO]; Asif H. Qureshi, Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and
the WTO Appellate Body, 48 INT'L & COM. L.Q. 199 (1999); Dierk Ullrich, No Need for Secrecy?-
Public Participation in the Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization, 34 U.B.C. L.
REv. 55 (2000). The role of NGOs is also well recognized in international environmental law. See
Tamyl Hunt, People or Power: A Comparison of Realist and Social Constructivist Approaches to
Climate Change Remediation Negotiations, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. (2001); Dan Tarlock,
The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of International Environmental Law,
68 CI.-KENT L. REv. 61 (1992). On the evolving role of private corporate interests in global
governance, see SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE (1996); Jessica Clapp, The Privatization
of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 1400 and the Developing World, 4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
A REVIEW OF MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 295 (1998) and Claire Cutler,
Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths: Dispute Settlement in Private International Trade Relations, 21
MILLENNIUM 3 (1995).
6. For a useful discussion of the nature of this initiative, and an analysis of the reasons for its
failure, see TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 2, at 357-65.
7. NAAEC, supra note 3.
S. See, e.g., Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 212; Michael J. Glennon, The New Interventionism, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1999, at
2; Josef Joffe, Rethinking the Nation State: The Many Meanings of Sovereignty, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-
Dec. 1999, at 122 (reviewing STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999));
Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty, FOREIGN POLICY, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 20; Peter J. Spiro, The New
Sovereigntists, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9; Martin Wolf, Will the Nation-State Survive
Globalization?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 178; Noam Chomsky, Sovereignty and World Order,
Dorothy L. Thompson Civil Rights Lecture (Sept. 20, 1999), available at
http:l/www.lbbs.orglehomsky/talks9909-sovereignty.htm; Noam Chomsky, Taking Control of Our
Lives: Freedom, Sovereignty and Other Endangered Species, Address at the 20th Anniversary of the
Inter-Hemispheric Centre (Feb. 2000) at http://www.irc-online.org/chomsky/texttranseripts.html. For
an earlier discussion that is directly relevant to many of the issues canvassed here, see Michael W.
Dunleavy, The Limits of Free Trade: Sovereignty, Environmental Protection, and NAFTA, 51(2) U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 204 (1993).
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transnational corporations and global civil society.9 Unfortunately, popular
and academic debate with respect to this thesis has been hampered by a failure
to use the concept of sovereignty in a consistent and coherent manner.
Whether it can be said that state sovereignty is in decline depends, in
part, on whether one defines sovereignty in terms of control or authority.
Those that contend globalization has undermined state sovereignty often focus
on the former: the declining capacity of states to regulate the flow of capital,
pollutants, diseases and ideas across territorial boundaries. 10 But sovereignty
also implies authority. At the core of the critique leveled by many
environmental and social justice organizations against trade and investment
liberalization agreements is the contention that such agreements compromise
the ability of states to pursue domestic policy priorities unconstrained by
external authority structures or requirements. The idea that statehood entails
freedom from external interference has traditionally been characterized as
"Westphalian sovereignty," a reference to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that
is often credited with ensconcing "the territorial state [as] the cornerstone of
the modern state system.""
A variety of rejoinders tend to be offered to the foregoing critique of free
trade agreements. It is said, for example, that in entering into such agreements
states are not relinquishing so much as exercising sovereignty.12 This line of
argument is premised on an alternative notion of sovereignty: the ability to
"be a player" within the international community of states. In an economically
interdependent world that imposes serious limits on unilateral action, it is a
state's "international legal sovereignty"-its ability to pursue its interests on
the international stage-that matters most.13 According to this view, any
adverse impacts on Westphalian sovereignty are more than offset by the
benefits that derive from membership in a rules-based trade regime.
The concept of Westphalian sovereignty has been buffeted by a variety
of scholarly critiques that have challenged its historical accuracy and its
descriptive utility. The orthodox belief that the contemporary state system was
born at Westphalia has been questioned by Andreas Osiander.14 Osiander
argues that the key attributes that have come to be identified with the concept
of Westphalian sovereignty did not emerge until the late nineteenth century, as
a justificatory ideology for the modern industrial state. Moreover, he contends
that the high level of state autonomy that existed during the period in which
Westphalian sovereignty enjoyed ascendancy was "historically exceptional
9. See STRANGE, supra note 5; Lipschutz, supra note 5; Grace Skogstad,
Internationalization, Democracy and Food Safety Measures: The (Il)Legitimacy of Consumer
- Preferences?, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 293 (1998).
10. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 12 (1999).
11. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE 294 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., McGraw-Hill, 6th ed. 1985) (1978).
12. William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United States Sovereignty: The
Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1225, 1232 (1998).
13. Id. at 1230.
14. Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55
INT'L. ORG. 251 (2001).
Games Without Frontiers
and transitory"; over the long term, the global system has been characterized
by complex "network[s] ... of cooperation and of mutual restraint."'15
Westphalian sovereignty has also been the subject of neorealist and
social constructivist critiques. The neorealist variant is exemplified in the
recent work of Stephen Krasner, who argues that Westphalian sovereignty is a
mere flag of convenience, of little value in predicting state behavior. 6 States,
he contends, have always invoked the concept strategically as a discursive
vehicle to justify the pursuit of their own self-interest. They ignore it just as
easily when it suits their purpose-a practice he colorfully terms "organized
hypocrisy." Westphalian sovereignty seems to enjoy even less support within
the social constructivist school. In contrast to the neorealists, proponents of
this approach contend that the conduct of international relations is being
fundamentally changed by the ever-increasing influence of non-state actors
and the exigencies of economic interdependence. These forces condition and
explain the nature of state participation in international affairs. According to
Abram and Antonia Chayes, sovereignty today is thus about "status"--the
ability of states to participate effectively as members of the international
system, which in turn is a function of their compliance with evolving
international norms and their cultivation of complex relationship networks.
17
Westphalian sovereignty, they suggest, if it "ever existed outside books on
international law and international relations... no longer has any real world
meaning."'
8
Finally, the Westphalian model of sovereignty has been taken to task by
the critical school international relations scholars for rendering "invisible" the
growing international power of private capital.' 9 According to this view,
transnational corporations have succeeded admirably in securing international
legal rights (of which Chapter 11 is but one illustration) while simultaneously
avoiding international legal responsibilities. A key reason for their success is
the persistence of the ideology of Westphalian sovereignty, particularly its
premise that states are the exclusive "subjects" of international law.20
Sovereignty must thus be reconceived in a way that holds transnational
corporations internationally accountable for their actions. To this end,
transnational corporations must be given international legal personality and
made "subjects" of international law.2'
A variety of phenomena, including the growing influence and power of
non-state actors, challenge settled assumptions about Westphalian
sovereignty. Notwithstanding these developments, however, the concept
retains powerful resonance in the trade and environment debate and has
15. Id at 283.
16. KRASNER, supra note 10, at 6-9.
17. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THENEw SOVEREIGNTY 27 (1995).
18. Id. at 26-27.
19. See, e.g., Fleur Johns, The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of
International Law andLegal Theory, 19 MELB. U. L. REv. 893 (1994).
20. A- Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International
Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT'L STUD. 133, 134 (2001).
21. Id. See also William Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory: Some Local Implications,
in 49 CURRENT LEGAL PROBL. 1, 6 (1996) (arguing that the "concept of legal personality" may be "ripe
for a revival in the global context").
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considerable utility as a heuristic device in illuminating both state discourse
and state behavior. While the origins of the concept are murky, the notion that
statehood is defined by a sovereign ability to determine domestic priorities is
well-entrenched and, as the NAFTA experience reveals, remains a critical
variable in determining state action. However, the NAFTA experience also
tends to support the conclusion that the way states perceive and respond to
threats to their Westphalian sovereignty is context-dependent; in particular, it
matters greatly on which side of the trade and environmental divide the
relevant threat is seen to arise.
Although the NAFTA investor claim and citizen submission processes
are still young, they are beginning to yield important decisions.22 This Article
scrutinizes these new procedures and analyzes the legal issues that they
present for investors, NGOs and states, particularly in terms of their
implications for the ability of governments to regulate for the protection of
public health and the environment, and to manage natural resources in a
sustainable manner. It argues that when designing the NAFTA regime, the
Parties paid little heed to the potentially far-reaching Westphalian sovereignty
implications of the investor claim process. It now appears that Canada has
awoken to some of these implications and has advocated that Chapter 11 be
reviewed and clarified with a view to affirming the right and ability of the
Parties to enact non-discriminatory measures aimed at protecting public health
and the environment.23 Until recently, this suggestion has received a
lukewarm response from the other NAFTA Parties.24 In contrast, throughout
both the initial design and subsequent implementation of the citizen
submission process under the NAAEC, the Parties-initially, Canada and
Mexico, and more recently, the United States2 5-have tended to exhibit a
highly protectionist approach to defending their Westphalian sovereignty.
These same NAFTA Parties have also tended to respond in protectionist
22. Five final rulings have been rendered under Chapter 11: Robert Azinian v. The United
Mexican States (Nov. 1, 1999), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (on file with The Yale Journal
of International Law); Waste Management, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, No. 1 (June 2, 2000),
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law),
Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States (September 2, 2000), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law), S.D. Myers, Inc. v.
Canada (November 13, 2000), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (on file with The Yale Journal
of International Law), and Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Canada (April 10, 2001), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law). Factual records in two
citizen submission cases have been released: Cozumel Pier (Mexico), SEM-96-001 (released October
24, 1997), available at http://www.cec.org, and B.C. Hydro (Canada), SEM 97-001 (released June 11,
2000), available at http://www.cec.org.
23. Some observers credit the leadership role Canada has recently taken on this issue to the
efforts of its current Trade Minister, Pierre Pettigrew. See, e.g., Note on NAFTA Commission's July 31,
2001, Initiative to Clarify Chapter 11 Investment Provisions, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., available
at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2001/trade_nafta_aug200I.pdf [hereinafter Note on NAFTA].
24. Mark MacKinnon, Canada Seeks Review of NAFTA "s Chapter]], THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
Dec. 13, 2000, at B1, B7. Canada's Minister of Trade, Mr. Pettigrew, has also stated that he will not sign
any new free trade deal-including the upcoming Free Trade Agreement of the Americas-that contains
similar investor claims provisions. Terence Corcoran, Ottawa's Campaign to Sabotage NAFTA,
FINANCIAL POST, Feb. 23, 2001, at C14-15. American and Mexican positions with respect to
clarification of Chapter 11 are described in Julie A. Soloway, Environmental Regulation as
Expropriation: The Case ofNAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 CAN. BUS. L. J. 92, 112 (2000).
25. See the discussions of recent developments, infra Section lIf.F.
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fashion to attempts by civil society organizations to secure participation rights
under the investor-state process.
In short, there is an asymmetry between how NAFTA Parties perceive
and respond to threats to their Westphalian sovereignty in relation to
transnational investors, on the one hand, and civil society organizations, on
the other. A goal of this Article, therefore, is to document and reflect on this
asymmetry; an asymmetry that, in my view, lends support to Krasner's
organized hypocrisy thesis. Based on the foregoing analysis, I conclude by
arguing that if states are to reap the potential social and economic benefits of
trade and investment liberalization, they must abandon their tendency to
regard engagement with civil society in sovereignty-protectionist terms.
Instead, they must strive to collaborate more closely with civil society in order
to more effectively incorporate environmental, public health and other social
values into trade law principles and decision making.
U1. INVESTOR CLAIMS UNDER NAFrA CHAPTER 11
A. Introduction
The most controversial feature of NAFTA in recent years has been
Chapter 11. While trade scholars have regularly commented upon the
unprecedented scope of the protections it accords foreign investors, only in
1998, when the Canadian Government paid 12.5 million dollars (U.S.) to
settle a Chapter 11 claim brought by U.S.-based Ethyl Corporation, did its
potential scope and implications begin to receive widespread attention. Since
then, a Chapter 11 tribunal has ordered the Mexican Government to pay close
to $17 million (U.S.) in damages, 27 and damages assessments are pending in
two other cases in which Canada has been found liable.
28
Chapter 11 imposes a variety of distinct obligations or "disciplines" on
NAFTA Parties in their dealings with NAFTA investors. 29 These disciplines
themselves are not particularly new. Drawing on well-established principles of
international trade law, they have direct antecedents in NAFTA's predecessor,
26. Gary N. Horlick & Alicia L. Marti, NAFTA Chapter 11B-A Private Right of Action to
Enforce Market Access through Investments, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 43, 53-54 (1997); Hope H. Camp Jr. &
Andres R. Kontrimas, Direct Investment Issues, in NAFTA AN BEYoND: A NEW FRAMEWORKX FOR
DOING BuSmESS iN THE AMEPiCAS 87, 103-104 (Joseph J. Norton & Thomas L. Bloodworth eds., 1995).
27. Final Award of the Tribunal, Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States (ICSID
Additional Facility), Aug. 30, 2000, available at http://www.naftaclaisns.com [hereinafter Metalclad]
(on file with The Yale Journal of International Law). On judicial review, this decision was recently
upheld in part. See The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 0664 (per Tysoe J.).
For a review of the court decision and its broader implications, see Chris Tollefson, Metalclad v. The
United Mexican States: Judicial Oversight of NAFTA 's Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim Process,
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE (forthcoming 2002).
28. S.D. Myers v. Government of Canada (U'NCITRAL), Nov. 13, 2000 (Partial Award),
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter S.D. Myers] (on file with The Yale Journal of
International Law); Pope & Talbot Award on the Merits (Phase R), Apr. 10, 2001, available at
http:lwww.dfait-maei.gc.caltna-naclAwardMerits-e.pdf [hereinafter Pope and Talbot (Phase IH)) (on
file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
29. The nature and implications of these disciplines is discussed in detail in infra Section II.D.
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the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. What is new is that under NAFTA,
investors gain the right to privately enforce these disciplines against a host
state. In particular, Chapter 11 now allows investors to secure compensation
from a host state for violations of these disciplines that cause harm to their
investments.
Critics of Chapter 11 portray it as a Bill of Rights for transnational
corporations, conferring on them the right to sue host governments for
enacting bona fide, non-discriminatory public health and environmental
regulations.30 They contend that not only can Chapter 11 be used to force
governments, and hence domestic taxpayers, "to pay polluters to stop
polluting," but that it is likely to profoundly "chill" the willingness of
governments to regulate in the public interest.
31
During the NAFTA negotiations, Chapter 11 was primarily championed
by the United States due to concerns about the investment environment in
Mexico, particularly constraints on investment access and compensation for
expropriation of business assets. Although historically the Mexican
government had vigilantly insisted on its right to regulate investment policy,
Mexican NAFTA negotiators were prepared to support Chapter 11 in order to
promote foreign direct investment.
32
For foreign investors, Chapter 11 offers significant new procedural
rights that exist in no other multilateral agreement.3 3 Under other multilateral
trade regimes, including GATT, companies that suffer damages due to the
actions of a foreign government have no right of private action against the
host state; their only remedy is to persuade their home state to pursue a trade
complaint on their behalf. Where this remedy is unavailable or inadequate
(which is almost invariably the case), the investor's only option is to pursue its
complaint under the sometimes inhospitable judicial system of the host
country.
Chapter 11 relieves the investor of the limitations, uncertainties, and
expenses associated with this latter option by offering instead a broad new
right to directly sue its host government for damages in a legally binding,
international adjudicative forum. In contrast to domestic courts designed with
procedural safeguards to guarantee openness and independence, and to
30. STEPHEN SHRYBMAN, THE WTo: A CITIZEN's GUIDE5-6 (1999).
31. See Submission by the International Institute for Sustainable Development to the Tribunal
with respect to application for amicus status in Methanex v. United States of America (UNCITRAL),
Aug. 25, 2000, available at http:ll www.naftaclaims.com (on file with The Yale Journal of International
Law).
32. Julie Soloway, Environmental Regulation as Expropriation: the Case of NAFTA 's
Chapter 11, 33 CAN. BUs. L.J. 92, 111-12 (2000).
33. Foreign investors enjoy rights analogous to those provided under Chapter 11 under the
provisions of bilateral agreements that exist between many countries. There are now well over 1,800 of
these agreements, known as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), worldwide. The United States and
other countries regard BITs as a means of laying the policy groundwork for broader multilateral
investment initiatives in the OECD and the WTO. See J. Martin Wagner, International Investment,
Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 471 (1999); S.D.
Myers v. Government of Canada (UNCITRAL), Nov. 12, 2000, 118 (Separate Opinion of Dr.
Schwartz, concurring, except with respect to performance requirements), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Schwartz separate opinion] (on file with The Yale Journal of
International Law). To date, there have been relatively few claims pursued through these various BITs
for reasons that "are not entirely clear." TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 2, at 357.
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provide a full hearing to all interested parties, Chapter 11 cases are
adjudicated pursuant to private commercial arbitral rules under which many of
these procedural safeguards are absent.34
B. Use of the Procedure
Since coming into force, eighteen Chapter 11 claims are known to have
been commenced, although the secrecy surrounding the claims process means
that this number could well be higher. 3
Most of the known claims to date have been against Canada (eight) and
Mexico (six); only four cases have been brought against the United States.
36
Seven of these eighteen claims involve government decisions in the areas of
environmental management or public health; four involve resource
management policies or decisions. Of the eleven Chapter 11 claims that fall
into either of these categories, four have been filed against Mexico, six against
Canada, and one against the United States.
Four of the six claims brought against Mexico concern the denial or
withdrawal of licenses or rights pertaining to the operation of waste
management or disposal facilities. Two of the claims against Canada have
challenged bans imposed on toxic substances due to public health and
environmental concerns, as is the case with the one "environmental" Chapter
11 claim against the United States. The remaining four claims against Canada
pertain to natural resource management decisions.37
To date, there have been final awards in five Chapter 11 cases.38 In three
of these, the investor's claim has succeeded in whole or in part. In the first,
Metalclad Corporation was awarded damages in the amount of $16.685
million (U.S.) on the basis of a finding that the Mexican Government had
interfered with its development and operation of a hazardous waste landfill.
39
The second successful claim, also brought by an American company (S.D.
Myers), alleged that the Government of Canada violated Chapter 11 by
banning the export of PCB waste to the United States, where S.D. Myers
operated a PCB waste treatment facility. Damages in this case have yet to be
quantified.40 Both of these cases are now before the courts by way of
34. See discussion infra Section II.E.
35. In this category, I include all claims in which a "notice of intent to arbitrate" has been
filed. One indicator of the opacity of the process is the fact that Chapter 11 decisions are not available
fior the NAFTA Secretariat's official web page. Many of the citations in this Article to Chapter i1
decisions are found on a privately maintained website, http:l www.naftaclaims.com. The Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has recently begun to post documents relating to
claims involving Canada at http://www.dfait-maeci.ge.eatna-nac/NAFTA. See also H. Mann, Private
Rights, Public Problems: A Guide to NAF1TA's Chapter on Investor Rights (2001), available at
http://www.iisd.orgltrade/privaterights.htm.
36. For further particulars with respect to these claims, see the chart in Appendix I.
37. Of the three remaining claims brought against the United States, two complain of unfair
treatment by American courts or under American law (Loewen Corp. v. The United States of America;
and Mondev International v. The United States of America ). The third (ADF Group Inc. v. The United
States of America) involves a challenge to preferential government procurement policy.
38. See supra note 22.
39. Metalclad, supra note 27, 73, 137,
40. See S.D. Myers, supra note 28, at 25.
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applications to have the awards set aside.41 In a recently released award, the
investor claim in Pope and Talbot was also upheld in part.42 The Government
of Mexico has prevailed in the two claims that arbitral tribunals have
dismissed.4 3
The most high-profile ongoing case is a $1.4 billion claim filed against
the United States Government as a result of a ban imposed on the fuel additive
MTBE by the Governor of California." The ban, to be implemented by the
end of 2002, was announced due to concerns about the harmful effects of
MTBE on the groundwater drinking supplies. The claimant is Methanex, a
Canadian company that is the world's leading producer of methanol, a key
element of MTBE. 5
C. Who May Claim?
An investor claim may be brought in relation to any "measure" that is
adopted or maintained by a Party.46 The definition of "measure" is
extraordinarily broad and open-ended. It specifically includes any "law,
regulation, procedure, requirement or practice" of a Party.47 As such, there is
no explicit requirement that the measure have legal force. For example,
statements made by government officials, in the course of their public duties,
that cause damage to an investor's reputation might be actionable if they can
be characterized as an expropriation of the investor's goodwill. 48
The definitions of "investor" and "investment" are similarly expansive.
49
"Investor" means anyone seeking to make, making, or having an
41. The Government of Mexico applied to set aside the award in Metalclad in the Supreme
Court of British Columbia. This application succeeded in part. See United Mexican States v. Metalclad
Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 0664 (per Tysoe J.), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nae/trans-
2may.pdf. The Government of Canada is pursuing a similar application in the S.D. Myers case in the
Federal Court of Canada. See News Release, Canada Seeks Application to Set Aside NAFTA Tribunal
Award, available at http:/webapps.dfait-maeci.ge.ca/ninpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec-I
Min Pub Does/103908.htm. Article 1130 provides that arbitrations shall be held at a defined location
within the territory of a Party. In both of these cases, the arbitrations were held in Canadian jurisdictions
and, as such, the appellants have sought review pursuant to the applicable arbitral rules under the laws of
that jurisdiction.
42. See Pope & Talbot (Phase II), supra note 28.
43. The two Mexican cases are Robert Azinian v. United Mexican States (ICSID Additional
Facility), Nov. 1, 1999 (dismissed on the ground, inter alia, that the contract annulment complained of
did not amount to an act of expropriation), available at http://www.naftaclaims.org (on file with The
Yale Journal of International Law); and Waste Management, Inc. (No. 1) v. United Mexican States
(ICSID Additional Facility), June 2, 2000 (dismissed on grounds that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to
consider claim due to fact that claimant had not properly waived its right to pursue claims in other fora
as required by Article 1121(2)(b)), available at http://www.nafiaclaims.org (on file with The Yale
Journal of International Law).
44. Bart Jansen, Trade Group Files Suit to Halt Ban on Fuel Additive MTBE, THE TIMES
COLONIST, Feb. 2, 2000, at D-9.
45. Barrie McKenna, U.S. Moves to Ban MTBE Fuel Additive, GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 21,
2000, at B-4; Methanex Uses NAFTA To Challenge California Gasoline-Additive Ban, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 1999, at Al2.
46. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 201.
47. Id.
48. HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE CLAIM PROCESS ON THE
ENVIRONMENT 23 (1999) [hereinafter MANN & VON MOLTKE].
49. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot v. Canada, June 26, 2000, (Interim Award), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/pubdoc7.pdf [hereinafter Pope & Talbot (Phase 1)] (holding that
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"investment." 50 "Investment" includes not only direct foreign investment in a
company or property located in the host Party, but also a wide range of
interests in virtually any form of enterprise operating in a host country. 51 The
recent decision in S.D. Myers interprets these already broad provisions in a
fashion that is generous to investor interests. In this case, the claim was
advanced on the basis that the "investor" was a U.S.-based private company
(S.D. Myers) and that its "investment" was Myers Canada, a company
incorporated in Canada. The Canadian Government argued that S.D. Myers
lacked standing to claim under Chapter 11 since it held no shares in Myers
Canada and there was no joint venture agreement between the two entities.
The tribunal rejected this argument on the ground that since the two legal
entities were effectively controlled by the same individual, technical
arguments with respect to corporate structure should not defeat "an otherwise
meritorious claim."
52
D. Nature of the Rights
Chapter 11 imposes six categories of disciplines on NAFTA Parties,53
which, when breached, are actionable by NAFTA investors. The disciplines
that have the greatest potential to affect Westphalian sovereignty with respect
to environmental protection and resource conservation are: the right to
national treatment (Article 1102) and to most-favored nation (MFN) treatment
(Article 1103); the right to international minimum standard of treatment
(Article 1105); the right to be free from certain performance requirements
(Article 1106); and the right to be compensated for nationalization or
expropriation of an investment and for "measures tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation" (Article 1110).
The relationship between these new "private" rights and the traditionally
accepted prerogative of governments to take action to protect public health
and the environment is not specifically addressed in the NAFTA text and is
the source of considerable controversy and uncertainty. Unlike -the GATT,
Chapter 11 of NAFTA does not contain a generally applicable provision that
prescribes how these competing private and public interests are to be
balanced.54 Under the GATT, this balancing function is performed by Article
XX (General Exceptions). This provision allows a state to defend a trade
restrictive measure on the basis that it is "necessary to protect human, animal
"investment" includes the property right of an investor to export its products to the U.S. market).
50. Article 1139 "Definitions," NAFTA, supra note 4.
51. The definition would appear to potentially include "foreign investments held by mutual
fund companies and other forms of pooled investment funds" and to permit foreign minority
shareholders (and, in some circumstances, bondholders) to instigate an investor claim even without the
consent of the local enterprise involved. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 48.
52. S.D. Myers, supra note 28, 1 229.
53. In addition to those set out below, Chapter 11 proscribes the imposition of nationality
requirements for senior management positions with respect to NAFTA investments (Clause 1, Article
1107) and obliges Parties to permit all financial transfers relating to an investment of a NAFTA investor
to occur freely and without delay (Clause 3, Article 1110). NAFTA, supra note 4.
54. The only discipline in Chapter 11 that is specifically made subordinate to environmental
considerations is Article 1106, paragraph 6. While the Article generally prohibits Parties from imposing
performance requirements, it creates a limited exception for measures that are capable of satisfying a test
based on language borrowed from Article XX of the GATT. See discussion infra at note 57.
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or plant life or health." To date, however, states that have sought to justify
health and environmental regulations under Article XX have enjoyed limited
success. 55 This has provoked criticism that the justificatory test is overly
onerous and should be reconsidered. 6 In the meantime, however, Article XX
has at least provided a vehicle for arguments about health and environment to
be mounted and considered in the context of trade disputes. 7
Does the absence of an Article XX-like provision in Chapter 11 of
NAFTA mean that a government cannot defend against an investor claim on
the basis that its actions were motivated by bona fide health or environmental
concerns? If this were true, those who have characterized the implications of
Chapter 11 as "revolutionary" would be vindicated, as such an interpretation
would represent a truly remarkable and unparalleled restriction on
Westphalian sovereignty. Many would argue, however, that such an
interpretation is implausible. For one, it is inconsistent with language in the
preamble of NAFTA and the NAAEC affirming that environmental protection
and economic development can and should be mutually supportive.5 It also
appears to conflict with Article 1114 (Environmental Measures) of Chapter
11, a provision that is often cited in support of the arument that NAFTA is
one of the greenest trade agreements ever negotiated. 5 This provision states:
"Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting,
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter
that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 60
Several trade experts have argued that the permissive nature of the
language of Article 1 114-in particular the caveat that such environmental
measures must be "otherwise consistent with this Chapter"-suggests that it
should be regarded as merely aspirational and of no legal consequence.61 In
55. George Hoberg, Trade, Harmonization and Domestic Autonomy in Environmental Policy,
3 J. COMP. POL'Y ANALYSIS 191, 197 (2001).
56. See SHRYBMAN, supra note 30, at 24; T.J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and
Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 268,
274-80 (1997) (presenting a detailed analysis of Article XX and stating that the burden ofjustifying the
use of Article XX "has not been carried often, largely because of the strictness with which the provisions
are interpreted").
57. George Hoberg argues that, notwithstanding the poor record of governments with respect
to justifying environmental and health measures under Article XX, arbitral interpretations of this
provision leave the regulatory sovereignty of governments much more intact than many critics have
suggested. Hoberg, supra note 55, at 191. Editor's Note: See also Steve Charnovitz, The Lma of
"PPMs" in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 59, 92-101 (2002)
(analyzing application of Article XX in WTO jurisprudence).
58. The Government of Canada has relied heavily on this argument in its intervention in the
appeal of the Metalclad decision before the Supreme Court of British Columbia. See Corcoran, supra
note 24.
59. See, e.g., John Kirton, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation and Canada-U.S.
Environmental Governance in the NAFTA Era, 1997 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 459; PIERRE MARC JOHNSON
& ANDRt BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFrA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW
CONTINENTAL LAW 121 (1996); Nicolas Kublicki, The Greening of Free Trade, 19 COLUM. . ENvTL. L.
59, 69 (1994) (calling NAFTA "the most 'environmentally conscious' trade agreement in history"). For
a more skeptical view, see Steve Chamovitz, NAFTA: Green Law or Green Spin?, 26 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1, 68, 76 (1994) [hereinafter Charnovit;, NAFTA: Green Law].
60. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1114 (emphasis added).
61. See BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA 195 (1994); JON RK JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 225 (1998) ("[The] provision [does not] contain any obligations in respect of the
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his separate opinion in S.D. Myers, however, Dr. Schwartz observes that such
an interpretation is implausible in that it implies Article 1114 is "empty
rhetoric."
62
Another source of interpretive uncertainty is whether a government
remains entitled, without being liable for damages, to invoke the
precautionary principle to defend measures it has taken-ostensibly to protect
human health or the environment-that are the basis of an investor claim. The
ability of governments to take a precautionary approach to dealing with
threats of serious or potentially irreversible damage to the environment is
reflected in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, 63 and is increasingly being
recognized to be part of customary international law. Again, however, there is
no explicit language in Chapter 11 that formally affirms the right of
governments to invoke this principle as a basis for defending actions that have
given rise to an investor suit. Despite this, a persuasive argument can be made
that the preamble to NAFTA, the existence of the NAAEC, and Article 1114
all suggest that Chapter 11 should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent
with the norms embodied in Rio's Principle 15.
Virtually none of the arbitral decisions under Chapter 11 to date have
grappled with these critical interpretive issues. An encouraging exception is
the tribunal's decision in S.D. Myers. As will be discussed, both reasons in
this case reflect a laudable aspiration to recognize the right of governments to
invoke environmental and health protection as grounds for defending claims
under Chapter 11, even though it is by no means clear that this is what the
drafters of the chapter intended or even contemplated.
We can now consider in more detail the scope and implications of the
rights investors have acquired under some of the key Chapter 11 disciplines.
1. National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment
National treatment and most favored nation (MN) treatment require a
Party to treat foreign investors and their investments as well or better than it
treats other investments in that country. Taken together, these disciplines
mean that a NAFTA investor is entitled to the better of (a) how the Party
treats domestic investors and investments (national treatment) or (b) how the
Party treats investors from any other nation (MfN treatment).
The ostensible aim of these provisions is to ensure that NAFTA
investors are not discriminated against on the basis of nationality. To this end,
the provisions require a Party to treat the investments of foreign NAFTA
environment that could be described as substantive."); Charnovitz, NAFTA: Green Law, supra note 59,
at 24 ("NAFTA has a related provision for environmental standards, but it is precatory, not
mandatory.").
62. In this vein, see the opinion of Dr. Schwartz in S.D. Myers where he states, "I do not think
that Article 1114 must be viewed as empty rhetoric . .. I view Article 1114 as acknowledging and
reminding interpreters of Chapter 11 (Investment) that the parties take both the environment and open
trade very seriously and that means should be found to reconcile these two objectives and, if possible, to
make them mutually supportive." Schwartz separate opinion, supra note 33, 118. For an extended
discussion of Article 1114, see John Wickham, Toward a Green Multilateral Investment Framework:
NAFTA and the SearchforModels, 12 GEo. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 617, 621-25 (2000).
63. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N.Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol.1)
(1992); 31 LL.M. 874 (1992).
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investors "no less favorably" than it treats investments made by its own
nationals or those made by MFN investors "in like circumstances."
Concerns have been raised that the terminology of "like circumstances"
will constrain the ability of governments to defend bona fide regulatory
decisions that are based on legitimate environmental or health considerations,
but result in foreign investors being treated differently from domestic
companies.64 These Westphalian sovereignty concerns are based on the
prospect that "like circumstances" will be interpreted in a manner that is
analogous to the way that the concept of "like products" has been interpreted
under GATT Article III. Article III has been interpreted to prevent states from
discriminating between products with the same physical characteristics on the
basis of how the products were produced or harvested (in trade parlance,
"process and production methods" or "PPMs"). Thus, under Article III,
products are often deemed to be "like" based on whether they are "directly
competitive or substitutable. 65
Critics have argued that if this market substitution interpretation is
imported into Chapter 11, it will severely curtail the ability of governments to
tailor environmental regulations in a site, substance, or context-specific
fashion without incurring Chapter 11 liabilities. 66 Governments often regulate
investments-domestic and foreign-based on concerns about the impacts of
an investment's specific process and production methods on the natural and
human environment in which it is sited. As such, it has been argued that "like
circumstances" must be interpreted to allow governments to treat similar
investments differently based on site specific environmental impacts and
considerations, the carrying or absorptive capacity of the receiving
environment now and in the future, and the sustainability of the raw material
inputs.
67
To date, the most extended arbitral consideration of "like circumstances"
is found in the S.D. Myers case. The tribunal emphasized that a determination
of whether an investor and a domestic competitor are in "like circumstances"
should rely on, among other things, whether there are circumstances "that
would justify government regulations that treat [investors] differently in order
to protect the public interest. '68 However, without addressing whether such
circumstances might exist in the case before them,69 the tribunal concluded
that S.D. Myers and its Canadian competitors were in "like circumstances" by
virtue of the fact that they were operating in the same "business sector."70
64. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 48, at 28-31.
65. Schoenbaum, supra note 56, at 289. Editor's Note: See also Chamovitz, supra note 57, at
101 (arguing that while PPM-based import bans may be inconsistent with GATT Article III, "if
undertaken for an environmental purpose, such measures still may qualify for an Article XX
exception").
66. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 48, at 29-30.
67. Id. at 30-31.
68. S.D. Myers, supra note 28, 243-251.
69. The separate reasons of Dr. Schwartz do address this critical question. He concludes that
the record before the tribunal did not disclose the existence of "unlike circumstances" that would have
warranted differential and adverse treatment. Schwartz separate opinion, supra note 33, 160-62.
70. S.D. Myers, supra note 28, 250-251.
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2. International Minimum Standard of Treatment
Article 1105 complements the protections that investors receive under
Articles 1102 (national treatment) and 1103 (MFN treatment). The duties
imposed by Articles 1102 and 1103 are relative in nature; as such, a Party's
compliance with these disciplines is defined in relation to how that Party treats
other investors and investments. In contrast, Article 1105 imposes an absolute
duty that renders irrelevant how the Party treats other investors or
investments. In other words, it is designed to ensure that investors and
investments of another Party receive treatment that is in accordance with an
absolute minimum standard. As explained in a recent arbitral ruling, Article
1105 "is a floor beneath which treatment of foreign investors must not fall,
even if a government is not acting in a discriminatory manner.,
71
Early commentators predicted that Article 1105 was unlikely to affect
Westphalian state sovereignty in relation to the pursuit of domestic
environmental and social policy.72 This was based on the assumption that the
ambit of Article 1105 coincided with existing norms of customary
international law. Within this body of law, violations of the international
minimum standard of treatment are typically only found to arise in situations
involving egregious abuses of state power, often involving physical
violence. 73 This high threshold is regarded as reflecting the strong deference
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to
regulate matters within their borders.74
Recent tribunal rulings have defied initial expectations by interpreting
the scope of Article 1105 in a manner that extends well beyond recognized
norms of customary international law.75 A case in point is Metalclad. In this
case, the tribunal relied on language in the NAFTA preamble and in Chapter
18 of the NAFTA to hold that Article 1105 imposed on the Parties broad
"transparency" obligations to ensure that all legal requirements applicable to
investments were "capable of being readily known to all affected investors." 76
Thus, according to the tribunal, where a party is aware that there is regulatory
uncertainty or confusion that might adversely affect an investor or an
investment, it is obliged to ensure that the applicable requirements are
promptly determined and clarified for the investor's benefit.
On the facts of the case, the tribunal held that the Government of
Mexico had failed to come to the aid of an investor that was encountering
legally "improper" local and state government opposition with respect to the•- 77
siting of a hazardous waste treatment facility. In its view, Mexico's failure to
intervene on behalf of the investor to resolve these difficulties constituted a
violation of Article 1105.78
71. S.D. Myers, supra note 28, 259.
72. See MANN& voNMOLTKE, supra note 48, at 34.
73. See Tollefson, supra note 27, in text accompanying note 102.
74. S.D. Myers, supra note 28, 263.
75. See Metalclad, supra note 27, at 26-32; Interim Award in Pope & Talbot (Phase 1), supra
note 49.
76. See Metalclad, supra note 27, at 26.
77. Id. at 31.
78. In its Final Award, the tribunal in Pope & Talbot (Phase I1) reached a similar conclusion
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The tribunal's holding with respect to Article 1105 was subsequently set
aside on judicial review.79 The reviewing court held that Article 1105 only
protected investors against state action that violated the minimum standard of
treatment recognized in customary international law. In its view, there was no
evidence that "transparency" had become a principle of customary
international law nor did the tribunal have authority to import such an
obligation into Chapter 11 based on language elsewhere in the NAFTA.8°
The open-ended interpretation of Article 1105 enunciated in Metalclad
and Pope & Talbot has also prompted unprecedented action on the part of the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission (the "Commission"), a three-member
supervisory body comprised of trade representatives nominated by each of the
NAFTA Parties. The Commission is empowered to issue "interpretive
statements" that are binding in all subsequent arbitrations under Chapter 11. 81
Since the late 1990's, the Government of Canada has advocated that the
Parties negotiate an interpretive statement to clarify the scope and meaning of
various aspects of the Chapter, including its controversial "expropriation"
provisions. Until the tribunal decision in Metalclad, Mexico strongly resisted
this suggestion, while support for such a statement within U.S. government
circles was lukewarm.82
Given this history, it is notable that less than three months after the
court's ruling on Metalclad, the Commission released its first-ever interpretive
statement.83 The statement affirms the court's conclusion that the obligations
of the Parties under Article 1105 are limited to providing treatment in
accordance with minimum standards of treatment prescribed in international
customary law. The statement goes on to provide that a breach of a NAFTA
provision outside Chapter 11, or provisions contained in other international
agreements, does not necessarily constitute a breach of Article 1105.
3. Prohibition on Performance Requirements
Historically, governments have employed measures that impose
conditions on foreign investment in order to advance domestic policy
objectives such as job creation, community economic development and
technology transfer. Under Article 1106, the imposition of "performance
requirements" of this kind is generally prohibited, subject to some
exceptions.84 This provision has been criticized as constraining the ability of
holding that under Article 1105 investors enjoy international minimum standards of treatment protection
as well as "fairness" elements of the type found in many Bilateral Investment Treaties including the
Model Investment Treaty of 1987. Pope & Talbot (Phase 11), supra note 28, 1 110-118. But see S.D.
Myers, supra note 28, T% 68-76 (holding that Article 1105 offers protections coincident with the
customary international law conception of international minimum standards of treatment).
79. Metalclad, supra note 27, 11 68-76.
80. Id.
81. Such statements acquire binding force by virtue of Article 1131(2). NAFTA, supra note 4.
82. See Soloway, supra note 32, at 111-12.
83. The Interpretive Statement was released on July 31, 2001. NAFTA Free Trade
Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-e.asp (hereinafter Interpretive Statement).
84. Related provisions exist that restrict the rights of a party to confer advantages on investors
(such as subsidies and tax incentives) that are conditional on domestic content or domestic purchasing
requirements. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1106(3).
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governments to sustainably manage natural resources and to protect public
health and the environment. Three prohibitions are considered to be
particularly serious derogations from Westphalian sovereignty. These include
prohibitions on requiring foreign investors, as a condition of establishing or
operating an investment, to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic
content; to use goods or services that are domestically produced or provided,
including hiring or using local workers or suppliers; or to transfer technology,
production process or other proprietary knowledge to domestic workers or
businesses.
The issue of performance requirements has only arisen in a few of the
arbitral decisions to date, most notably in the interim ruling in Pope & Talbot
and in the S.D. Myers decision. In the latter case, Article 1106 was
characterized, in a separate opinion, as severely restricting the ability of host
states to impose performance requirements on investors.
85
Unlike other Articles found in Chapter 11, Article 1106 specifically
exempts "environmental measures" taken by governments. Borrowing
language from Article XX of the GATT, this exemption is notionally available
where a government can demonstrate that a measure is not a disguised trade
barrier and is necessary "to protect human, animal or plant life; or [is]
necessary for the conservation of. . . exhaustible natural resources., 86 As
noted earlier, the arbitral case law that has developed under Article XX
concerning what is deemed to be "necessary" has been criticized as being
onerous in that it requires governments to establish that it is impossible to
achieve their health or conservation goals in a less trade-restrictive manner.87
Whether sustainable resource management measures can be justified
under this exception is uncertain. In the province of British Columbia, for
example, forest legislation requires companies that harvest timber from Crown
land either to use the timber within the province or manufacture it within the
province into lumber or other sawn wood products. 88 Increasingly, there are
calls to strengthen these local processing requirements in order to better
maximize use of the resource, promote local value-added manufacturing and
support the development of alternative community and First Nation-owned
forest tenures.89 The constraints imposed by Chapter 11 on domestic policy
initiatives of this kind became a source of considerable debate and concern in
1999, when MacMillan Bloedel, Canada's largest forest company, was taken
over by U.S.-based Weyerhaeuser.
90
85. S.D. Myers, Schwartz separate opinion, supra note 33, 190.
86. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1106(6) (emphasis added).
87. The European Community successfully invoked Article XX in defending a ban on the
import of asbestos and asbestos products that was the subject of a trade challenge brought by Canada.
See WTO Dispute Settlement Decision, European Communio-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-containing products, WT/DS135/R (November 8, 2000) at http://www.wto.org; see also
SCHOENBAUM supra note 56, at 276; Hoberg, supra note 55, at 206-07.
88. See STEVEN SHRYBMAN, THE WTo: A CTzEN's GUIDE 71 (Mar. 1999 draft) (citing the
Forest Act of British Columbia), available at http:llwww.wcel.org/wcelpubl1999/12757b.html (last
accessed Dec. 20, 2001).
89. Deborah Curran & Michael M'gonigle, Aboriginal Forestry: Community Management as
Opportunity andImperative, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 711 (1999).
90. For a thorough Chapter 11 analysis of the takeover see Jessica L. Clogg, Re: Proposed
Acquisition of MacMillan Bloedel by Weyerhaeuser-NAFTA Chapter 11 Implications, available at
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Another concern is that export or import bans on the flow of goods
across borders could be construed to violate Article 1106. This concern is
highlighted by the Ethyl and S.D. Myers claims. In both of these cases, the
Canadian Government-purporting to act on the basis of health and
environmental concerns-restricted the cross-border movement of goods. The
Ethyl case involved a ban on the importation into Canada of a fuel additive
(MMT) produced by Ethyl; the S.D. Myers case involved a ban on the export
of PCB waste to the United States, where Myers operated a waste treatment
facility. The investor claimants in these cases argued that the bans violated
Article 1106 by effectively forcing them to relocate their operations, in order
to meet domestic content and purchasing "requirements," if they wished to
carry on business in Canada.
If this analysis of Article 1106 is correct, it has been argued that any
border measure affecting the flow of goods or services between NAFTA
Parties is vulnerable to challenge as a performance requirement, no matter
how general and incidental its impact is on a foreign investor or investment.
91
In defending the Ethyl and S.D. Myers claims, the Canadian Government
argued against this broad interpretation, contending that the prohibition on
performance requirements should be construed as applying only to express
conditions or obligations placed on the presence or operation of a business in
the territory of a Party.,
92
In S.D. Myers, the tribunal was unable to arrive at a common view of
how Article 1106 should be interpreted. While the tribunal and Dr. Schwartz
agreed that it was necessary to look beyond the actual, express conditions
imposed on the investor by the host government (to "look at substance, not
only form"),93 they parted company as to whether Canada had violated Article
1106. The tribunal concluded that it had not. In his separate opinion, however,
Dr. Schwartz held that the effect of the ban was to require S.D. Myers to
undertake physical disposal of the PCB waste in Canada and that this
constituted a prohibited "Canadian content" requirement in contravention of
Article 1106(1)(b).
4. The Right to Compensation for Expropriation
The most controversial aspect of Chapter 11 is the scope and nature of
the rights it confers on investors to be compensated for government
expropriation. Civil society critics fear Article 1110 will deter governments
from enacting regulations to protect public health and the environment. They
argue that if governments are obliged to compensate investors for adopting
http:/lwww.wcel.org/forestry/O902weyernaftasub.html (on file with The Yale Journal of International
Law). Ultimately, Weyerhaeuser felt compelled to try to neutralize some of these concerns by
committing not to resort to Chapter 11 as a means of challenging current or future provincial
government forestry regulation.
91. Hoberg, supra note 55, at 35.
92. Statement of Defense, Ethyl Corp. v. Gov't of Canada, (27 Nov. 1997), 86, available at
www.naftaclaims.com (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law), Statement of Defense, S.D.
Myers v. Government of Canada (18 June 1999), 49-51, available at www.naftaclaims.com (on file
with The Yale Journal of International Law).
93. S.D. Myers, supra note 28, 273.
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new environmental regulations during the life span of a foreign investment,
this will effectively freeze the applicable law as of when the investment is
made.94 From then on, it is claimed, a government may be liable to pay
compensation whenever it imposes any additional environmental or
conservation requirements on the investor that might be dictated by new
scientific knowledge, emerging cumulative impacts analyses or evolving
social or environmental values.
These concerns rest on the potential that Article 1110 will be interpreted
to require governments to compensate for bona fide, non-discriminatory
environmental regulation. Such an interpretation would entail a significant
departure from existing international law. It has traditionally been assumed
that governments are entitled to take regulatory action that adversely affects
the value of a propelr without paying compensation as long as the action is
taken in good faith.9 Thus, non-discriminatory municipal bylaws, taxation
measures, and environmental laws that diminish the value of a property do not
normally give rise to a right to government compensation.97 The standard
rationale offered for this result is that to do "otherwise would make it
impossible for governments to carry out their legitimate functions" 98 and
would represent a serious derogation from their sovereignty. 99
There are two recognized situations in which international law imposes a
liability on governments to compensate property owners for expropriating or
"taking" property rights. The first is where government physically confiscates
or nationalizes foreign-owned property, in the process acquiring title to the
property in question. The second is where government causes serious harm to
an investor's property rights by exercising its regulatory authority in an
improper or discriminatory manner. In international law this is referred to as
"indirect," "disguised," or "creeping expropriation." In this situation, the
owner of the property retains title, but the value of their property is drastically
diminished or eliminated by arbitrary or unfair state action including
exorbitant taxation, forced sale of property or shares, arbitrary cancellation of
business licenses or permits, or harassment or expulsion of the investor.100
A threshold issue is whether Article 1110 mirrors or expands upon the
protection extended to investors under existing international law. Most
commentators agree that since the terms "expropriation" and "indirect
expropriation" are not defined in NAFTA, tribunals must draw on customary
international law jurisprudence, paying little or no attention to the meaning
that these concepts have acquired under the domestic laws of the Parties.
This begs the question: Does Article 1110 create a broader right to
94. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 48, at 46.
95. Id.
96. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 299 (1994);
Wagner, supra note 33, at 509. See generally Evan Atwood & Michael J. Trebilcock, Public
Accountability in an Age of Contracting Out, 27 CAN. Bus. L.J. 1, 45 (1996); Bums H. Weston,
"Constructive Takings" Under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of "Creeping
Expropriation," 16 VA. 1. INT'L L. 103 (1975).
97. JOHNSON, supra note 61, at 224.
98. Id.
99. SORNARAJAH, supra note 96, at 299-300.
100. See id. at 283-84.
101. TREBILCOCK & HowsE, supra note 2, at 354.
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compensation for government regulation than exists under current
international law?
Investor claimants have argued that it does, seeking to align Article 1110
with the broader property rights protections applicable under American law
against "regulatory takings." Investors rely on three arguments based on the
language and structure of the Article. First, they contend that Article 1110
broadens the definition of compensable government taking by including
"measures tantamount to expropriation." Second, they note that Article 1110
states that the requirement to compensate does not depend on whether the
challenged government action is taken for a public purpose. (Indeed, the
language of the Article clearly contemplates that a right to compensation may
exist even if the government has taken the impugned action for a valid public
purpose). Third, they emphasize that, unlike the discipline relating to
performance requirements discussed above, Article 1110 does not contain an
exemption for "environmental measures" necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life, or for the conservation of natural resources.
10 2
Using these arguments, Ethyl contended that a right to compensation for
expropriation occurs "whenever there is a substantial and unreasonable
interference with the enjoyment of a property right.', 10 3 Another investor has
asserted, in a similar vein, that a compensable expropriation arises whenever
"government action interferes with [an investor's] use or enjoyment of
property."
' 104
Early arbitral attempts to define "expropriation" for the purposes of
Article 1110 have been disappointingly cursory and uneven. On the one hand,
several Chapter 11 tribunals have dismissed the contention that Article 1110
broadens the right to compensation for expropriation otherwise available
under international law. For instance, in Pope & Talbot, the tribunal
emphatically rejects the suggestion that the phrase "measures tantamount to
expropriation" represents an expansion of the prevailing concept of
expropriation under international law.10 5 The decision in S.D. Myers affirms
even more forcefully that Article 1110 should not be interpreted in a manner
that expands the internationally accepted liability of states to compensate for
regulatory takings. The tribunal observes that while there is a possibility that
government regulatory conduct could form the basis for a valid claim to
compensation, it is "unlikely" that such conduct could form the basis for
"legitimate complaint under Article 1110." 106 The separate opinion provides
an even more explicit response to civil society concerns about Article 1110.
These reasons conclude that, considered in its proper legal context, "it is not
possible to see [Article 1110] as a generous invitation for tribunals to impose
liability on governments that are engaged in the ordinary course of protecting
health, safety, the environment and other public welfare concerns."10
102. The only explicit exceptions set out in Article 1110 are extremely narrow and pertain to
intellectual property and the effect of non-discriminatory measures relating to a debt security or loan
Article. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1110(7) and (8).
103. MANN & VON MOLTME, supra note 48, at 42 (citing Notice of Arbitration filed by Ethyl).
104. Id. at 43 (quoting Notice of Claim filed by Loewen).
105. Interim Award in Pope & Talbot (Phase 1), supra note 49, at 34.
106. S.D. Myers, supra note 28, 28 1.
107. Schwartz separate opinion, supra note 33, 214.
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At the same time, however, early arbitral articulations of the actual
scope and meaning of Article 1110 have tended to be disquietingly expansive.
By far the broadest interpretation of Article 1110 is found in Metalclad. In this
case the tribunal held that indirect expropriation occurs when, by virtue of a
regulatory requirement, the investor suffers "a covert or incidental
interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the
owner in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit of property" regardless of whether the requirement benefits
the host state.108 In adopting this approach, the tribunal ignored, without
giving reasons, the traditional international law requirement that the party
alleging that it has suffered "indirect" or "disguised" expropriation show that
the impugned government action was taken for an improper purpose.
Moreover, again without providing supporting authority, the tribunal held that
Article 1110 imposed an obligation to compensate not only for loss of
property use but also for the loss of the economic benefits associated with
ownership of the property. Similarly, in Pope & Talbot, the tribunal rejected
Canada's argument that non-discriminatory regulation enacted in the exercise
of police powers should be exempted from the reach of the chapter.
Contending that such regulations can constitute a compensable form of
"creeping expropriation," it opined that "a blanket exception for regulatory
measures would create a gaping loophole in international protections against
expropriation."
109
The Westphalian sovereignty implications of these early arbitral rulings
have not escaped the notice of the NAFTA Parties. It is not certain whether
they anticipated, on entering into the NAFTA, the potential impacts of Article
1110 on the fiscal viability and legal validity of measures aimed at protecting
public health and environment. It is clear, however, that all three Parties
support a concept of expropriation that is significantly narrower than that
which has been articulated in these early rulings.
10
Momentum now appears to be building in favor of issuing an
interpretive statement on Article 1110. Such a statement might well take the
form of a declaration that would exclude from challenge non-discriminatory
measures based on a public purpose that are consistent with a legitimate
objective as defined in Article 915(1).1 As noted earlier, 112 the Government
108. Metalclad, supra note 27, at 34.
109. Pope & Talbot (Phase 1), supra note 49, at 35. To this, one is tempted to respond that if
this is a "gaping loophole," it is certainly quite an established one, well-grounded in customary
international law. It is noteworthy that in support of this conclusion the tribunal relied not on arbitral
authority but on the Restatement Third Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., which is generally regarded
as articulating a lower threshold as to what constitutes a compensable taking than is often accepted as
customary international law. See Soloway, supra note 32, at 103; David Schneiderman, NAFTA's
Taldngs Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J 499, n.11 (1996).
110. The U.S. Government intervened before the tribunal in Metalclad to argue that Article
1110 does not expand the traditional meaning of "expropriation" in customary international law, the
Government of Canada adopted the same position as intervener when the matter went to judicial review,
and Mexico has asserted the same position throughout the claim process See Submission of the U.S.
Government in The United Mexican States v. Metalclad (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), 9, Outline
of Argument of the Government of Canada in The United Mexican States v. Metalclad (B.C.S.C), 65-
67 and Petitioner's Outline of Argument in The United Mexican States v. Metalclad (B.C.S.C.), 560-
591. All three are on file with The Yale Journal of International Law.
111. Chapter Nine of NAFTA sets standards with respect to the creation, maintenance and
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of Canada has been an active proponent of such a statement since the late
1990S. 1 13 With the Commission's recent release of its first interpretive
statement, and continuing civil society pressure to clarify or reform Chapter
11, the likelihood of the Parties negotiating an interpretive statement that




As noted earlier, Chapter 11 disputes are arbitrated pursuant to
procedures and in fora originally designed for, and predominantly used to
resolve, private commercial disputes. After commencing a Chapter 11 claim,
the investor may elect to have the dispute adjudicated under one of three sets
of international arbitral rules.'1 5 Whichever set of rules is selected then
governs the arbitral procedure, unless otherwise stipulated in NAFTA.
n6
Since NAFTA is generally silent on procedural issues relating to Chapter 11
claims, the process of adjudicating such claims is largely governed by the
procedures contained in, and discretion conferred by, the applicable arbitral
rules.
Under Article 1123 of NAFTA, investor claims are to be adjudicated by
a three-member tribunal. The disputing parties are each entitled to select a
member; they are then jointly required to appoint a third member to act as
tribunal chair. Although this appointment procedure is well accepted in
commercial arbitration, it has come under heavy criticism as being
inappropriate to the adjudication of disputes under Chapter 11 on several
grounds.'1 7 One concern is neutrality-raised by the prospect of parties being
operation of technical regulations and sanitary measures by the Parties. Article 915(1) prescribes the
legitimate objectives that such regulations and measures may validly serve. These "legitimate
objectives" are defined to include:
(a) safety,
(b) protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers,
(c) sustainable development,
(d) considering, among other things, where appropriate, fundamental climatic, or other
geographical factors, technological or infrastructural factors, or scientific justification,
but does not include the protection of domestic production.
See Lucien J. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment: The Lessons of
Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209, 213 (2001).
112. See discussion in text accompanying notes 23-24.
113. Canada's trade minister recently confirmed that he has sent a letter to his American and
Mexican counterparts to this effect on this issue. MacKinnon, supra note 24, at B-1.
114. See IISD's analysis of the interpretive statement in Note on NAFTA, supra note 23, at 4-5.
115. These are: The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (the
"ICSID") Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, and the United Nations Commission for
International Trade Law Arbitration (the "UNCITRAL") Rules.
116. See NAFTA, art. 1120(2). Since Canada and Mexico are not signatories to the ICSID
Convention, currently Chapter 11 arbitrations occur either under the auspices of the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL Rules; Schedule C to the Rules Governing the Additional Facility for
the Administration of Proceedings by the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(Additional Facility Rules) ICSID/1 1, June 1979. See also the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. G.A.O.R., 31st sess., Supp. No. 17, at 46, Ch. V, § C,
U.N. Doc. A131/17 (1976).
117. Soloway, supra note 32, at 108-11 (arguing that the NAFTA negotiators have erred by
incorporating the UNCITRAL and ICSID Rules); see also The NAFTA Cone of Silence, GLOBE AND
MAIL, Aug. 26, 1998 (contrasting the transparency of domestic judicial processes in those governing
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able to designate one of the panel members.118 A second concern is whether
nominees appointed under this procedure will have sufficiently broad
expertise to adjudicate issues outside of traditional trade law, with
implications that transcend trade, entailing public policy analysis, and
assessment of complex environmental and health issues." 9
Legitimacy concerns are further exacerbated by the procedures and
norms that normally govern the adjudication of such cases. Unlike judicial
proceedings, these tribunals typically operate in a realm of secrecy-a shroud
that is given legal force by virtue of "confidentiality orders" that tribunals
regularly make in Chapter 11 cases, with the consent of the disputing
parties. 12°
Throughout the entire Chapter 11 claim process, up to and including the
arbitral award itself, the only mandatory public notification or disclosure
occurs when a claimant is required to notify the NAFTA Commission
Secretariat of its desire to convene an arbitral panel.12 ' Upon receipt, the
Secretariat must publish this notice on a public registry. 122 As a result, at
present, it is impossible to know reliably how many investor claims have been
threatened or are pending.
An important emerging issue is in what circumstances third parties
should be allowed to file amicus or intervener briefs and have access to the
information and arguments filed by the Parties in Chapter 11 cases.
Increasingly, international organizations have come to appreciate the benefit
associated with receiving briefs and submissions from interested third parties,
and made procedural accommodations to this end.' 23 For instance, in an
unprecedented move in late 2000, the Appellate Body of the WTO issued
guidelines that specifically invited NGOs to apply for leave to participate as
amicus in a forthcoming appeal in the EC asbestos ban case. Curiously,
having received a number of submissions seeking intervener status, the
Appellate Body, under apparent pressure from WTO member countries,
ultimately decided to reject all of the applications it received without giving
reasons.
124
Chapter 11 cases); Can We Talk?, GLOBE AND MArL, Sept. 1, 1998, at A14 (arguing that Chapter 11
cases should not be governed by the same confidentiality rules normally applicable in private
commercial disputes).
118. In the WTO, this concern has been addressed by vesting in the WTO Secretariat the power
to suggest a hearing panel in each case, subject to an objection for cause by one of the parties. In the
event of an objection, the Director General is empowered to appoint the panel. MANN & VON MOLTKE,
supra note 48, at 14.
119. Mann, supra note 35, at 39.
120. See Note on NAFTA, supra note 23, at 1-2; see also Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and
NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CI. J. OF INT'L. L. 213 (2001) (expressing doubt whether, absent the
consent of the parties, private commercial arbitrations are governed by a principle of confidentiality and
asserting that, in any event, such a principle ought not to apply in Chapter 11 arbitral proceedings).
121. Id. See MANN& VON MOLTKE, supra note 48, at 51-56 (discussing Art. 1126 (10)).
122. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1126(13).
123. Independent Review Committee, Four-Year Review of the NAAEC, at 20 n.51 (1998),
available at http'//www.cee.org.
124. See Communication from the WTO Appellate Body, European Community-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTADS135/9 (Nov. 8, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org. See also Briefs in a Twist, THE ECONOmST, Dec. 9, 2000, at 93.
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In two separate applications, Canadian and American NGOs have
recently sought amicus status in the Chapter 11 claim being pursued by
Methanex.125 The NGOs sought the right to observe the proceedings and make
oral and written submissions to the tribunal on the broad policy questions
raised by the cases.126 Methanex and the Government of Mexico opposed their
application, invoking the private commercial arbitral principle that third
parties can only be granted access to material submitted or standing to make
submissions with the consent of the disputing parties. The applicants claimed
that this principle should not apply to arbitrations under Chapter 11, and that
there were strong public interest grounds for the tribunal to exercise its
discretion to grant their request.
After concerted lobbying by civil society groups, both the American and
Canadian Governments lent their qualified support to these applications. 127 In
its legal brief, Canada expressed general support for greater transparency in
the investor claim process and urged the tribunal to allow the petitioners to
file written submissions. 128 The United States, as Respondent, argued that, as
a general rule, amicus submissions should be permitted where they are likely
to assist the tribunal. The United States also supported the petitioners' request
that they be allowed to attend hearings and receive copies of all filed
documents. 
129
The tribunal's decision represents a cautious yet important step towards
making the arbitral process under Chapter 11 more transparent and publicly
accountable. 130 A key element of the decision is the tribunal's conclusion that
it has discretion, in appropriate cases, to receive and consider written amicus
submissions. At the same time, however, the tribunal concluded that without
the agreement of all parties to the arbitration, it could not allow the petitioners
to attend the hearing or to receive documents generated within the arbitration.
Moreover, the tribunal did not make a final decision as to whether this was an
125. The Canadian organization is the International Institute for Sustainable Development. The
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund is acting on behalf of several U.S.-based NGOs.
126. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America (UNCITRAL), Jan. 15, 2001, 5-7,
available at http://www.naflaclaims.com (hereinafter Methanex Amicus Decision) (on file with The Yale
Journal of International Law).
127. Mark MacKinnon, Canada, U.S. Support Role for NGO in NAFTA, GLOBE AND MAIL,
Nov. 24, 2000, at B7. For a highly critical editorial reaction to expanding NGO participation in Chapter
11 proceedings, see Peter Foster, Who Let the NGO Dogs Loose on NAFTA?, FINANCIAL POST, Dec. 1,
2000, at C-19, which characterizes such participation as "the thin end of the wedge the allows NGOs to
undermine NAFTA in the name of bogus transparency." It lauds the Mexican government's opposition
to NGO involvement in the process as "the only hope for preventing ... the NGO hordes ... from
nullify[ing] the protections of property that Chapter II provides."
128. Methanex Amicus Decision, supra note 126, 10.
129. Id. 16-23.
130. As this Article goes to print, a new ruling on third party intervention in Chapter 11 cases
has been rendered in the matter of United Parcel Serv. v. Gov't of Canada, available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nae/IntVent.oct.pdf. In this case, the applicants sought to be added as
parties to the proceeding or, alternatively, to be given amicus status to make written submissions. All
three NAFTA parties opposed adding the applicants as parties but again, as in Methanex, were divided
over the issue of whether the applicants should be allowed to make written submissions. Canada and the
United States did not oppose the applicants being given an opportunity to make written submissions on
the merits, while Mexico took the position that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to make such an order. In
the result, the Tribunal dismissed the application for party status. It did, however, hold that it had
authority to receive written submissions from interveners and indicated that it would consider doing so
at a later stage in the proceeding.
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appropriate case in which to exercise its discretion to accept written amicus
submissions, deferring the decision until later in the arbitral process when it
would be in a better position to assess whether such submissions would be of
assistance in its deliberations.' 3 '
American and Canadian Government support for civil society
participation in the Methanex arbitration reflects an emerging sense that the
procedural rules and institutional assumptions governing Chapter 11 cases
must be significantly overhauled to enhance transparency and public
participation. To this end, specific reforms that have been advocated include
making the legal documents filed in such cases accessible on an electronic
public registry, specific provisions for amicus and intervener applications to
be brought and for the general public to attend hearings, and a requirement
that tribunal decisions be published.
32
Headway towards these goals was made with the release of the
Commission's recent interpretive statement. 133 In this statement the
Commission confirmed that, subject to limited exceptions, nothing in either
NAFTA or in the applicable arbitral rules precludes the Parties from releasing
(or compels them to keep confidential) any documents submitted to or issued
by a Chapter 11 tribunal. The statement also committed the Parties to make
timely, public disclosure of all documents submitted to, or issued by, a
Chapter 11 tribunal with the exception, inter alia, of information a Party is
bound to withhold under "the relevant arbitral rules, as applied."'134 It is
certainly possible to interpret the statement with skepticism, particularly
insofar as it does not fetter the discretion of tribunals to make confidentiality
orders (of the type that have been routinely made in the past) that would
prevent a Party from making information available to the public. Nonetheless,
civil society organizations have generally welcomed the statement as an
encouraging development, and one that they hope future tribunals will bear in
mind when interpreting the applicable arbitral rules and exercising their
discretion in future cases. 135
IMI. CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS UNDER ARTICLES 14 & 15 OF THE NAAEC
A. Introduction
The citizen submission procedure is a key component of the NAAEC, 136
the environmental side agreement to NAFTA brokered in 1992-1993 by
President Clinton to consolidate support for NAFTA in Congress. 137 While
Chapter 11 of NAFTA has received more mass media attention, the citizen
complaint procedure is arguably its counterpart in terms of its importance to
the long-term legitimacy of the NAFTA-NAAEC regime.
131. MethanexAmicus Decision, supra note 126, 47-52.
132. Soloway, supra note 32, at 11.
133. Interpretive Statement, supra note 83.
134. Id. at A2a.
135. Note on NAFTA, supra note 23.
136. NAAEC, supra note 3.
137. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Sept. 14, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993) was also negotiated at this time.
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The NAAEC created a new institution: the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) based in Montreal. The CEC is governed
by a Council. The Council is composed of Cabinet-level appointees from each
of the three member countries with domestic responsibility for environmental
protection. The affairs of the CEC are administered by a full time Secretariat
located in Montreal, under the direction of an Executive Director. The CEC
also receives ongoing advice and information from the Joint Public Advisory
Committee (JPAC) comprised of fifteen citizens, five from each of the three
NAFTA countries. 138 The NAAEC also contemplates that each Party may
convene a National Advisory Committee (NAC) comprised of members of the
public to advise it on the implementation and further elaboration of the
Agreement. 139
The CEC has two key functions. The first is to foster cooperation and
coordination among the Parties on hemispheric environmental issues and trade
and environment linkages through joint research and regional initiatives. The
second function is to be an environmental watchdog mandated to oversee,
under the direction of the Council, the enforcement of environmental laws by
the Parties.140 The vehicle through which it performs this latter role is the
citizen submission process, which is elaborated in Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC.
Any resident of a Party may file a submission with the Secretariat
claiming that a Party "is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws."
Providing the submission satisfies certain procedural prerequisites set out in
Article 14(1),141 the Secretariat then considers whether the submission
warrants requesting a "response" from the Party against whom it is made
based on criteria set out in Article 14(2). These criteria include whether the
submission raises matters that deserve "further study" and whether the
submitter has pursued "private remedies" available under domestic law. Once
the Secretariat has received and considered the response of a Party, it ma
then recommend to the Council that a "factual record" be prepared.
1 2
Approval to prepare a factual record requires a two-thirds vote by Council. 143
When completed, the factual record is delivered to the Council, which, again
by a two-thirds vote, may decide to release some or all of its contents to the
JPAC and/or to the public. 144
In preparing the factual record, the Secretariat may consider information
provided by third parties including governments, non-governmental
organizations, and experts. The terminology "factual record" is significant.
This record contains a summary of submissions received in relation to the
complaint, a summary of other relevant factual information, and the facts as
138. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 16.
139. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 17.
140. Independent Review Committee, supra note 123, at 4-5.
141. This Article does not focus on the specifics of these requirements, which are well
canvassed in JOHNsoN & BEAULIEU, supra note 59, and David L. Markell, The Commission for
Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submission Process, 12 GPO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 545 (2000).
142. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 15(1)
143. Id. art. 15(2).
144. Id. art. 15(7).
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found by the Secretariat relating to the matters raised in the complaint.
145
Most observers agree, however, that "given its name, it probably cannot
include an evaluation or judgment by the Secretariat," 146 or any
recommendations for remedial action. Nor is it necessarily contemplated that
the Council will take any specified action or make recommendations
following receipt or release of the factual record.
As with the investor-state claim process, the NAAEC came about as the
result of prevailing political forces and perceptions, particularly those in the
United States. NAFTA had been negotiated under the Bush administration,
and was opposed by many traditional supporters of then-Governor Clinton in
the labor and environmental communities. In his Presidential campaign,
Clinton promised to "fix the NAFTA" to address these concerns. One of the
key environmental concerns with NAFTA related to the prospect that it would
override domestic environmental protection law-a prospect highlighted by
the 1991 GATT decision that held that a U.S. law protecting dolphins by
banning tuna imports constituted an invalid trade restriction.147A second
concern was that NAFTA would create strong incentives, particularly for
Mexico, to lower environmental standards and to relax enforcement of
environmental laws to attract trade and investment.
148
To a limited degree, the NAFTA text that had already been negotiated
addressed these concerns. Language in the investment chapter exhorted,
without requiring, Parties not to lower, waive, or derogate from their
environmental standards to attract investment.149 Other provisions recognized
the right of Parties to adopt their own non-discriminatory level of
environmental protection. 50 NAFTA was also made subordinate to certain
international environmental treaties.1
5'
These provisions did not mollify U.S. environmental groups. 152 These
groups lobbied the newly-elected Clinton administration for an international
commission to oversee the enforcement of environmental laws in the NAFTA
region with the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance. The clear
preference of the NAFTA Parties, including the United States, was to achieve
environmental objectives via suasion and cooperation. Relinquishing
adjudicative authority over assessing domestic environment performance to a
supra-national body was strongly opposed by all Parties as an unacceptable
intrusion on Westphalian sovereignty.
145. See NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 15; Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC, § 12.1, in NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (winter 1998), available at
http://www.cec.org [hereinafter Submission Guidelines].
146. JOHNsON& BEAULiEU, supra note 59, at 158.
147. Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc.
D29/R (August 6, 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594.
148. JOHNSON & BEAUuEU, supra note 59, ch. 40.
149. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1114(2).
150. Id. art. 1114(1).
151. Id. art. 104.
152. For a comprehensive discussion of the role of environmental NGOs in the NAFTA
negotiations, see JOHN. J. AuDLEY, GREEN POLITICs AND GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND THE FUTURE OF
ENVIROINMENTAL POLITICS (1997).
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As a result, Clinton secured support of the NAFTA partners for a
compromise that left Westphalian sovereignty largely intact with respect to
the determination of environmental standards and environmental enforcement.
On the one hand, the NAAEC imposed a new obligation on each Party to
effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations, an obligation that
would be subject to a citizen complaint process supervised by a fact-finding
body (the Secretariat) that received instructions from a tripartite Council.
Ultimately, however, the effective enforcement obligation was left effectively
unenforceable. Under this compromise, the only way a Party could be
sanctioned for breaching this obligation was in the unlikely event that the
Council voted to pursue a complaint against a Party to an arbitral panel. For
this to occur, a Party would be required to initiate proceedings in its own
name, independently of citizen submission process, under a complex "party-
to-party" dispute settlement process provided for in Part Five of the
NAAEC.
15 3
B. Use of the Procedure
Since 1995, thirty-one citizen submissions have been filed with the CEC
Secretariat. 154 Each of the NAFTA Parties has been the subject of a roughly
comparable number of complaints: eight have targeted the United States,
thirteen have been filed against Mexico, and ten have been brought against
Canada. The volume of submissions brought each year has been relatively
constant.
155
Twenty-one files are now closed. Of these, thirteen have been dismissed
or terminated by the Secretariat under Article 14 and four have been
terminated by the Secretariat under Article 15(1). In one case the Council has
turned down a recommendation that a factual record be prepared pursuant to
Article 15(2). One case has been withdrawn. Factual records have been
prepared and made public in two cases.
There are ten active files. In five of these cases (including the first-ever
case involving the United States), the Council has recently instructed the
Secretariat to prepare factual records. 156 Prior to receiving these instructions,
the Secretariat was currently preparing a factual record in just one case.
157
153. See NAAEC, supra note 3, arts. 22-24, 31-36.
154. CEC Secretariat, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters: Status, available at
http://www.cec.org (visited Oct. 22, 2001). All citations in this Article to CEC decisions are cited from
this source, which is the official web page of the CEC Secretariat. The decisions are available under
Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters: Registry and Public Files of Submissions.
155. For a summary of information on these complaints, see the chart in Appendix II.
156. These cases are Oldman River 1I (Canada) SEM-97-006, available at http://www.cec.org;
Aquanova (Mexico) SEM-99-006, available at http://www.cec.org; Migratory Birds (United States)
SEM-99-002, available at http://www.cec.org; B.C. Mining (Canada) SEM-98-004, available at
http://www.cec.org (hereinafter B.C. Mining); and B.C. Logging (Canada) SEM-00-004, available at
http://www.cec.org. It is significant that in four of these five cases, the Council did not follow the
recommendation of the Secretariat with respect to the scope of the factual record. See infra text
accompanying notes 220-23, and discussion in CEC News "CEC Council Votes on Five Factual Record
Recommendations" (Oct. 19, 2001) available at http://www.cec.org.
157. Grupo Ecol6gico Manglar A.C. (Re United Mexican States) SEM-98-006, available at
http://www.cee.org. In a recent Article, it is suggested that the current resources of the Secretariat are
inadequate to deal with the impending burden of preparing factual records that are likely to be ordered in
Games Without Frontiers
The Secretariat's first factual record involved an allegation that the
Mexican Government had failed to comply with environmental assessment
requirements in authorizing construction of a pier at Cozumel. 158 The other
factual record that has been released involved allegations that the Canadian
Government had failed to enforce the Fisheries Act against B.C. Hydro, a
provincial Crown power utility.
159
Citizen submissions have been received on a wide variety of subject
matters, including allegations with respect to failures to effectively enforce
air, land and water pollution laws, species protection laws, and environmental
assessment regulations.
C. Who May File a Submission?
Any "non-governmental organization or person established or residing
in the territory of a Party" may file a submission. 160 The definition of NGO is
broad and includes any profit or non-profit group that is not affiliated or
directed by government.161
Most submissions have been filed by environmental or public health
organizations. However, in three cases, private corporations have filed
complaints. 162 The best known of these is a submission filed by Methanex, a
Canadian-based fuel additive company with American operations, whose
product-MTBE-was scheduled to be banned by the state of California.' 63
In addition to seeking damages in connection with this ban under Chapter 11,
as noted earlier, Methanex also filed a citizen submission alleging that the
state of California was failing to effectively enforce its groundwater protection
laws against various point source polluters.
164
The vast majority of submissions have been filed by environmental
NGOs (ENGOs) against their home government. In several cases, however,
where the non-enforcement allegation presents transboundary implications,
ENGOs from both sides of the border have collaborated in bringing the
complaint 165 In two cases, ENGOs from all three countries have jointly filed
the submission.
166
the near future. John Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law, 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 79 (2001).
158. Comite para la Proteccion de los Recursos Naturales, A.C. (Re Mexico) SEM-96-001,
available at http://www.cec.org [hereinafter Cozumel Pier].
159. B.C. Aboriginal Fisheries Comm'n (Re Canada) SEM-97-001, at http://www.cec.org
[hereinafter B.C. Hydro].
160. Submission Guidelines, supra note 145, § 2.1.
161. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 45.1 (defining "non-governmental organization").
162. Alliance for the Wild Rockies (Re United States) SEM-99-002, available at
http://wvw.cec.org; Neste Canada Inc. (Re United States) SEM-00-002, available at
http://wvvw.cee.org; Mercerizados y Tenidos de Guadalajara, S.A. SEM-01-003, available at
http://wvww.cec.org.
163. Methanex Corp. (Re United States) SEM-99-001, available at http://www.cec.org.
Another corporation later followed suit and filed a virtually identical complaint. Neste Canada Inc. (Re
United States) SEM-00-002, available at http://www.cec.org.
164. Both the Methanex and Neste submissions were dismissed by the Secretariat on June 30,
2000, because of the pendancy of other proceedings including Methanex's claim for damages under
Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Determination A14/SEM 99-001/06/14(3), available at http://www.cec.org.
165. See Biodiversity Legal Foundation (Re United States) SEM-95-001 (addressing U.S.
failure to enforce endangered species legislation due to rider on military readiness Act), available at
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D. Oversight of the Submission Process by the Secretariat
In overseeing the submission process, the Secretariat performs two
distinct functions: interpreting and applying the legal language of the NAAEC
and administering the process to ensure that submissions are processed in a
timely and efficient manner. The Secretariat has received high marks on the
former front. As one close observer has put it, the "Secretariat's decisions
appear to be grounded on carefully reasoned legal interpretations of the
Agreement rather than on fear of adverse reactions by, or the desire to curry
favor with, either the Parties or the Submitters."
167
In terms of timely and effective administration of the submission
process, the assessment is more mixed. A common complaint is that the
process is too slow, and concerns have been raised that a very serious backlog
of work with respect to the preparation of factual records is imminent.168 A
key reason for these delays is what might be termed "institutional tensions." If
these tensions can be reduced, the timeliness of the process will likely
improve. Before considering the sources of these tensions, and the prospects
for their minimization, I will consider the legal interpretive issues with which
the CEC has been, or will soon be, grappling.
E. Nature of the Right
1. Defining "Environmental Law"
Before processing a complaint, the Secretariat must conclude that the
complaint alleges that a "Party is failing to effectively enforce its
environmental law., 169 A key threshold issue for the Secretariat, therefore, is
what constitutes an "environmental law."
The NAAEC defines "environmental law" as any "statute or regulation
of a Party" that has as its primary purpose the protection of the environment or
human life or health. 170 Explicitly excluded from this definition are worker
health and safety laws171 and laws that have as their primary purpose the
harvesting of natural resources whether for commercial, subsistence or
aboriginal uses. 172 This does not mean, however, that all natural resource
http://www.cee.org; B.C. Hydro, supra note 159 (alleging non-enforcement of the Fisheries Act against
B.C. Hydro); Dept. of the Planet Earth, SEM-98-003 (alleging non-enforcement of the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement by the U.S. Government), available at http://www.cee.org.
166. See Sierra Club (Re United States) SEM-95-002 (addressing the failure of the United
States to enforce federal environmental laws due to disaster relief rider), available at
http://www.cec.org; Alliance for the Wild Rockies (Re United States) SEM-99-002 (regarding failure of
the United States to enforce Migratory Birds Treaty Act), available at http://www.cec.org.
167. See John Knox, Comments on Lessons Learned from the History of the 14/15 Procedure 3
(Sept. 22, 2000) (unpublished document submitted to JPAC) (on file with The Yale Journal of
International Law). See also Joseph F. DiMento & Pamela M. Doughman, Soft Teeth in the Back of the
Mouth: The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 651,
695-96 (1998).
168. Knox, supra note 167.
169. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 14.1.
170. Id. art. 45.2(a).
171. Id. art. 45.2(a).
172. Id. art. 45.2(b).
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management laws secure immunity from review under the NAAEC. As
Professor Knox points out, in order to determine whether its primary purpose
is to protect the environment or human health, a specific provision must be
assessed on an individual basis, not by reference to the primary purpose of the
statute of which it forms a part. 3 Laws that are specifically contemplated as
falling within the definition include those pertaining to pollution prevention,
abatement or control; control of hazardous substances and wastes; and
protection of flora, fauna, and natural areas. 174
Intriguingly, there is no requirement that a complaint relate to an
environmental amenity that is traded among the NAFTA Parties, nor that the
complaint claim that the alleged pattern of non-enforcement has trade
implications or consequences. 175 To date, only a few complaints have
explicitly tried to address this latter connection.
176
The Parties deliberately exempted from the citizen submission process
complaints pertaining to a government's decision to rewrite its environmental
laws or standards in a manner that might detract from their effectiveness.
Instead, they decided that the concern about the downward pressure of trade
on environmental laws, and inter-jurisdictional "pollution haven" competition,
would be dealt with by way of a non-enforceable exhortation. 77
The obligation to defer to legislative action is recognized in several
decisions of the Secretariat. In two of its early cases, the Secretariat declined
to proceed with complaints that were based on allegations that legislative
riders, passed by the U.S. Congress, nullified the ability of federal regulators
to effectively enforce laws protecting endangered species. 78 In a similar vein,
the Secretariat held that it could not investigate a complaint that Canada had
failed to enforce the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.
179
Although Canada had signed and ratified the Convention, the Secretariat
concluded that the Convention was not part of Canadian domestic law, since
the federal government had not formally implemented it by way of statute or
regulation. It should be noted, however, that the Secretariat has not excluded
the possibility that its jurisdiction might, in other circumstances, extend to
issues "concerning a Party's international obligations.''80
173. See Knox, supra note 157, at 82-83.
174. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 45.2(a).
175. See Why Exactly Does this NAFTA Commission Exist?, GLOBE AND MAIL, May 23, 2000,
at A-14 (describing the NAAEC as one of the "strangest" international treaties and advocating that the
CEC charter be rewritten to require that complainants establish that the alleged lack of effective
environmental law enforcement was an attempt to secure a trade advantage).
176. B.C. Hydro, supra note 159; B.C. Mining, supra note 156.
177. JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 59, at 165 ("There was no reason to restrict NGO
submissions ... to 'enforcement matters.' NGOs should have been allowed to present evidence
establishing that a NAFTA party is lowering environmental norms in an attempt to attract investments.
The possibility of preparing a factual record based on such evidence would have been a useful addition
to the NAAEC."); see also NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 3.
178. See Biodiversity Legal Foundation, supra note 165; Sierra Club, supra note 166.
179. Convention onBiodiversity, June 5, 1992, 31 LL.M. 822 (1992).
180. Great Lakes Secretariat Determination under Art. 14 (Sept. 8, 1999), SEM-98-003
available at httpY/www.cec.org (hereinafter Great Lakes Art. 14 Determination).
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2. Defining "Failure to Effectively Enforce"
If the Secretariat concludes that a complaint relates to the enforcement
of an "environmental law," it must then consider whether there is evidence
that a Party is failing "to effectively enforce" the law.
It is notable that, for the purposes of a citizen complaint, there is no need
to allege or establish that a pattem of non-enforcement exists. In this regard,
the citizen submission provisions differ from the Party-to-Party dispute
resolution provisions of the NAAEC, which are triggered by an allegation that
there is a "persistent pattem of failure" by a Party "to effectively enforce its
environmental law."'18
a. Deemed Exemptions to the Obligation to Effectively Enforce
The NAAEC specifically provides that a Party shall be deemed not to
have failed in this obligation in two situations. The first is where the alleged
failure "reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect of
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or compliance matters." The second
arises where the alleged failure "results from bona fide decisions to allocate
resources to enforcement in other environmental matters determined to have
higher priorities. 182
As yet, it remains unsettled whether a Party is entitled to invoke these
exemptions upon being asked by the Secretariat to respond to a particular
citizen submission. If this course of action were open to a Party, the
Secretariat would be obliged to entertain evidence and reach conclusions as to
whether either of these exemptions apply as a threshold issue prior to deciding
to recommend the preparation of a factual record. To make a determination of
this kind would impose onerous information gathering responsibilities on the
Secretariat. To assess whether there were grounds to justify invocation of the
first exemption, the Secretariat would require a comprehensive familiarity
with the Party's record of enforcement in similar instances; to assess whether
the latter exemption applied would require familiarity with a Party's
environmental budgeting and priority identification processes.
Moreover, such an approach imposes the duty to grapple with vexing
and sensitive legal questions on the Secretariat. In relation to the first
exemption, the Secretariat would be required to decide whether a Party has
exercised its discretion "reasonably." The Secretariat would consider a variety
of factors to make this determination, including whether the Party fettered its
discretion, acted or failed to act for improper reasons, or took into account
irrelevant considerations. Presumably, the Secretariat would also have to
consider whether the submitter had presented evidence that negated a Party's
reliance on this exemption.1 83 The Secretariat would face similar interpretive
181. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 22.1.
182. Id. art. 45.1(a)-(b).
183. This might include evidence that the Party had engaged in a persistent pattern of non-
enforcement and that the failure could not therefore be considered the product of a reasoned, case-
specific exercise of discretion. The B.C. Hydro complaint illustrates this strategy. This complaint
identified thirty-seven instances where Canada's fisheries law was violated without prosecutorial action
being taken, noting that, since 1990, only two prosecutions have been pursued. Similar evidence was put
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difficulties were it called upon, as a threshold issue, to decide if a Party should
be allowed to escape the obligation to enforce effectively its environmental
laws due to internal budgetary priorities. To meet the test prescribed by this
exemption, it would not be enough for a Party to claim that its budgetary
resources limit its enforcement capabilities. Rather, a Party would need to
satisfy the Secretariat that it had deliberately chosen to allocate funds to other
environmental priorities that would otherwise be available for enforcement.
The complexity and political sensitivity surrounding the resolution of
these issues would strongly suggest that the Secretariat should not deal with
them as threshold matters. Instead, if a Party were inclined to rely on these
exemptions, the better approach would be for it to so stipulate (and provide
relevant documentation) during the factual record preparation process. This
stipulation and accompanying documentation would then form part of the
factual record without the necessity of a determination as to the merits or
applicability of the grounds upon which the exemption was claimed.
b. What Constitutes a "Failure" to Effectively Enforce?
The above exemptions deem specified government conduct not to
constitute "failures" to effectively enforce environmental laws. This leaves
unsettled the broader question of what does constitute such a failure. The
relevant definition contained in Article 45(1) contemplates complaints that
allege either "action or inaction" on the part of "agencies or officials" of a
Party. 84 Thus, a submission may allege that a "failure" to effectively enforce
has occurred either by virtue of inadvertent governmental action or inaction
(i.e., poor internal communication, lack of agency coordination, or regulatory
negligence) or due to more overt and deliberate forms of government action
(i.e., allocating inadequate resources, adopting policies that are inconsistent
with the requirements of an environmental law or pursuing a practice of non-
adversarial, "sympathetic" regulation).
However, the Secretariat has emphasized that an alleged failure to
effectively enforce must be related to a specific governmental enforcement
obligation such as adequate compliance monitoring or to other duties that are
prescribed in domestic law. Thus, a failure to implement a general legislative
direction (such as promoting pollution prevention), the attainment of which is
left to regulatory discretion, is not regarded by the Secretariat as a matter over
which it has jurisdiction.1
8 5
c. What Constitutes "Effective Enforcement"?
A closely related issue of considerable contention, which has arisen in
the context of B.C. Hydro, concerns how to define "effective enforcement."
An interpretation apparently favored by some Parties 1 6 is to measure the
forward in B.C. Mining, supra note 156, and Centre quebecois du droit de l'environment, SEM-97-003,
available at http'J/www.cec.org.
184. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 41.1.
185. See Great Lakes Art. 14 Determination, supra note 180.
186. Following the Council's meeting in Banff in July 1999 (which led to some relatively
minor amendments to the submission guidelines to be promulgated), the Parties engaged in an ongoing
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effectiveness of enforcement exclusively in terms of whether the efforts
undertaken have actually protected the environment from harm. 187 Under this
approach, the factual record could address neither the level of compliance
with the law in question nor the effectiveness of the law in meeting its
environmental purpose.'
88
Canada's NAC is on record as strongly opposing this proposal to narrow
the Secretariat's interpretive mandate. 189 It contends that environmental harm
is but one indicator of effective enforcement, just as is the question of whether
the law has met its environmental purpose. In its view, the ultimate issue to be
addressed by a factual record is whether the government has secured
compliance with the law in question.
Several considerations strongly support the more liberal interpretation
urged by Canada's NAC. First of all, the NAAEC does not require Parties to
protect the environment from harm. In deference to their Westphalian
sovereignty, Parties are allowed to freely choose their own preferred level of
environmental protection. What the NAAEC does require is that Parties
"effectively enforce" environmental laws they enact, which are presumably
designed to achieve a Party's chosen level of environmental protection. In
short, the citizen submission process is not about preventing environmental
harm per se but rather holding governments responsible for enforcing
environmental laws. Focusing on environmental harm also presents
substantial informational challenges. Environmental harm is not always easy
to document or assess; typically, documenting and assessing compliance is
much more straightforward. Finally, preventing environmental harm is not the
only goal of environmental regulation. To focus narrowly on whether
environmental harm has occurred means ignoring the broader question of
whether and to what extent the environment has been put at risk by non-
compliance.
series of confidential communications with respect to a wide range of interpretive and administrative
issues. See Paul Knox & Barie McKenna, NAFTA Partners' Environmental Deal at Risk; Groups Say,
GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 27, 2000, at A-9. According to this report, environmentalists claimed that this
secretive process was instigated by Canada with Mexican support. This proposed change was one of a
series of amendments to the submission guidelines that Canada apparently proposed during these
negotiations. See Knox, supra note 157, at 70 (stating that during these Party discussions, "Canada
raised many of the issues, and many observers of the CEC believed that Canada's concerns resulted at
least in part from disagreements between it and the Secretariat over how the Secretariat was preparing
the B.C. Hydro factual record").
187. Letter of Advice from NAC Canada 2-3 (June 18, 1999), available at
www.naaec.gc.ca/english/nac/advice/adv991.htm [hereinafter NAC Letter of Advice]. This was also the
position advanced by Mexico, and rejected by the Secretariat in its decision to accept the submission, in
Cozumel Pier, supra note 158. See discussion in Knox, supra note 157, at 94-95.
188. See Environment Canada Discussion Paper (Oct. 13, 1999) (on file with The Yale Journal
of International Law).
189. See NAC Letter of Advice, supra note 187. The position of NAC Canada is consistent
with the position taken by the U.S. government. Position of the Government of the United States of
America on Legal Issues Relating to Submissions on Enforcement Matters and Preparation of Factual




1. The Institutional History
Almost from its inception, the citizen submission process has provoked
questions about the role of the Secretariat and the nature of its relationship to
the Parties and with the Council. In addition to administering the citizen
complaint process, the Secretariat is vested with more "traditional"
responsibilities of providing technical, administrative, and operational support
and advice to the Council. This has led some to question whether it is
desirable or even possible to house within the CEC both a "watchdog" role
and these more traditional, cooperative functions that form the bulk of its
work program.190 In particular, some Parties have raised the concern that, in
carrying out this former function, the Secretariat has acted in a manner that is
adversarial to the Party being investigated.' 9'
On the fourth anniversary of the NAAEC, the Council commissioned an
independent review committee (IRC) to report on and advise with respect to
these and other issues. Its report was a strong endorsement of the concept and
design of the citizen complaint process. According to the IRC, "any
adversarial aspects of the process are outside the role or control of the
Secretariat, but arise from the empowerment of individual citizens or groups
to initiate a submission 'against' a Party."'192 In its words, the process reflected
a laudable "trend toward increased citizen involvement in international
mechanisms to address environmental issues."' 193 The report characterized the
process as "belonging" to the 350 million citizens of North America "who are
empowered to initiate it, and for whose benefit it was developed.'
194
The IRC concluded its review by expressing the hope that the "current
tension"' around the citizen complaint process could be reduced. This could be
achieved if the Parties worked hard at "scrupulously apply[ing] the NAAEC,"
rather than seeking to amend the process, and if they "respected the discretion
provided to the respective decision-makers at different points in the
process.' 95 Subsequent experience has proven this to be wishful thinking. If
anything, in the years following the IRC review, institutional tensions
surrounding the submissions procedure have escalated.
In the lead-up to the Council/JPAC summer meeting in 1999, the
Council sought public input on a package of amendments to the submission
guidelines aimed at clarifying and, in many respects, circumscribing the
powers of the Secretariat. 9 6 Ultimately, under pressure from the NGOs, JPAC
and the NACs, major changes to the guidelines were postponed. However,
virtually as soon as this decision was made, the Parties engaged in a second
"confidential" round of discussions with respect to a proposed new set of
190. Independent Review Committee, supra note 123, at 22.
191. Id. at21-22.
192. Id. at 5.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 54-55.
196. CEC, The CEC calls for public comments on the revised guidelines for Article 14 and 15
of the A'AAEC (September 10, 1998), available at http:llwww.cec.org
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guideline amendments. 197 The proposed changes in this round were more far-
reaching than those advanced in the preceding one, including the creation of a
Council-appointed working group with responsibility to oversee the
Secretariat's preparation of factual records.
When these discussions came to light a few months before the
Council/JPAC meeting held in Dallas in June of 2000, civil society groups
organized a continental coalition to lobby against the contemplated changes.
Ultimately this coalition emerged from the Dallas meeting claiming victory.
At the meeting, the Council not only deferred amending the guidelines, but
also passed a resolution that has the potential for making future discussions
about the design and implementation of the submissions process considerably
more transparent and inclusive. This resolution tasks JPAC with the ongoing
role of providing advice to the Council on issues relating to the
"implementation and elaboration" of the submissions process. Under the
resolution, any Party, the Secretariat, or a member of the public may raise
issues "concerning the implementation or elaboration" of the submissions
process with the Council, who may then refer the matter to JPAC for its
consideration. 198 It also requires the Council to provide written reasons for any
decision made "following advice received by JPAC." Finally, the resolution
mandates that JPAC conduct a public review of the history of the submissions
process, with a view to submitting a report to the Parties on the "lessons
learned."' 199
The decision to enhance the role of JPAC is a positive development.
However, the issues and uncertainties that precipitated the showdown in
Dallas linger and seem likely to resurface.
2. Current Tensions
a. The Ability of the Secretariat to Access Information
One area of continuing tension concerns the ability of the Secretariat to
carry out its fact-finding function. The NAAEC imposes a general obligation
on the Parties to provide the Secretariat with such information as is necessary
197. Knox & McKenna, supra note 186, at A-9.
198. See Council Resolution 00-09, available at http://www.cec.org/who we are/jpac/Artl4-
15/index.cfm.
199. This JPAC report was presented at the 2001 Council meeting held in Guadalajara, Mexico.
Lesson Learned: Citizen Submissions under Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC: Final Report to the
Council of the CEC (June 6, 2001), available at http://www.cee.org. The Report emphasized both the
need for the Secretariat's independence to be respected, and the need to expedite the process. It also
made various suggestions aimed at enhancing the transparency of the process. One such suggestion was
to require the Secretariat and Council to provide, as a matter of course, reasons for their decisions.
Another was to abolish the controversial 30-day "blackout" period (which prevents the Secretariat from
informing a submitter that it has recommended preparation of a factual record to the Council) and to
eliminate the requirement that the Secretariat refrain from disclosing the reasons for such a
recommendation until the Council has acted. Finally, the Report recommended that a Party that has been
the subject of a factual record should be required to report on what actions, if any, it has taken in
response to the record within a reasonable time. In response, the Council agreed to reduce the "blackout
period" to five days and to permit, at that juncture, the Secretariat to publish the reasons for its
recommendation. The Report's other recommendations would, in its words, "require further
consideration." Council Communiqu6 (June 29, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org.
Games Without Frontiers
to administer the submissions process. 20° In reality, however, the Secretariat
must rely on the cooperation of the Party whose actions are being investigated
to disclose this information voluntarily. As Johnson and Beaulieu wryly
observe, "depending on the circumstances, there might... be a temptation for
the party complained against to procrastinate or to be lax in collecting
damning evidence."20' Moreover, if a Party deems a request for information to
be "excessive or ... unduly burdensome," it may notify the Council, which,
by a majority vote, can impose restrictions on the scope of the request.
202
In a significant gesture of deference to Westphalian sovereignty, a party
is also entitled to decline to disclose information if it would not be required to
disclose such information under its own laws pertaining to business or
proprietary information, personal privacy or confidentiality in government
decision-making. 203 If a Party chooses to provide such information to the
Secretariat, it may require the Secretariat to keep the information
confidential.204
Governments have not been timid in invoking the benefits of these
provisions. In two cases, the Government of Mexico designated as
"confidential" material that it provided to the Secretariat in response to a
complaint.20 5 In one of these cases, it has asserted confidentiality over its
entire response.20 6 Pursuant to newly enacted Submission Guidelines (the
"Guidelines"), the Secretariat has requested, in these instances, that Mexico
provide a summary of the information designated "confidential" and an
explanation of its confidentiality claim.20 7 Without this information, the
Secretariat would find itself in the unenviable position of having to provide
reasons for dismissing the complaint, or alternatively, ordering production of a
factual record, without being able to make reference to the contents of the
government's response. Accordingly, it is hoped in the interests of
transparency that parties will normally see fit to provide summaries of this
kind to the Secretariat when requested.
Confidentiality has also become a concern during the factual record
preparation process. In preparing a factual record in the B.C. Hydro case, the
Secretariat convened an expert panel to assist in its investigation. The panel
established a procedure under which it solicited submissions from the
submitters, B.C. Hydro, and the Government of Canada in three successive
meetings. Parties were invited to attend as observers at the meetings when
their counterparts where scheduled to make submissions.
200. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 21.1
201. JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 59, at 156.
202. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 21.2
203. Id. art. 39.1
204. Id. art. 39.2
205. Academia Sonoreuse (Re United States of Mexico) SEM-98-005, available at
http://www.cec.org; Environmental Health Coalition (Re United States of Mexico) SEM-98-007,
available at http://www.cec.org [hereinafter Environmental Health Coalition].
206. In the Environmental Health Coalition case, id, the Government of Mexico has recently
reconsidered its position and withdrawn its confidentiality claim. See Council Communiqu6, supra note
199.
207. Submission Guidelines, supra note 145, § 17.3. The Guidelines were approved by JPAC
on June 28, 1999.
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While the submitters and B.C. Hydro cooperated fully in this
arrangement, Canada refused to meet with the panel, either alone or in the
presence of the other parties.20 8 Although it eventually agreed to answer
questions in writing, due to the vague and incomplete nature of the answers
provided, a protracted process of "follow-up questions" ensued.209 One of the
apparent reasons that Canada objected to this procedure was a concern about
disclosing sensitive information. 21 Consequently, Canada has proposed that
the submission Guidelines be amended to require that information submitted
to the Secretariat (or its independent experts) in connection with the
preparation of a factual record be kept secret until the Council has made a
decision on whether to make the factual record public.
21'
To sequester all information-confidential, "sensitive," or otherwise-
tendered by parties as part of the factual record process would be a significant
and troubling departure from the NAAEC and current Guidelines. The present
regime is one that emphasizes transparency. Subject only to confidentiality
claims allowed under the NAAEC or the Guidelines, the Secretariat is
required to place all information it considers in preparing a factual record
(including submissions from the complainant and Party) in an open public
file.212 Under this regime, the touchstone for non-disclosure is confidentiality;
that a Party might deem disclosure of the information embarrassing or
sensitive is not ajustification for secrecy.
A further difficulty with the approach proposed by Canada is that, if it
were adopted, and the Council subsequently exercised its discretion to not
make a factual record public, all of the information considered by the
Secretariat in preparing the record would be permanently sequestered.
b. The Secretariat's Discretion over Preparation of Factual
Records
The B.C. Hydro process has also prompted Canada to raise concerns
about the Secretariat's authority to determine the process by which the factual
record is prepared. In particular, it suggests that the Secretariat and
independent experts working on its behalf are not, and should not be,
empowered to "engage in an interactive public meeting process to gather
information during the factual record process. '213 This suggestion is motivated
208. See Paul Knox, Canada Refuses Meeting Before NAFTA Panel, GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr.
28, 2000, at A-11; Heather Scoffield, Ottawa Stifling Hearings, Groups Say B.C., GLOBE AND MAIL,
Mar. 8, 1999, at B-3.
209. Factual Record in B.C. Hydro, supra note 159, 1 48-52 (June 11, 1999); see also R.
Christensen, The CEC Citizens submission Process: Citizen Empowerment or Failed Experience? 80
(1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
210. Telephone Interview with Randy Christensen (March 10, 2000).
211. Environment Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 188.
212. Submission Guidelines, supra note 145, §16(1) ("The Secretariat will maintain a file on
each submission at its headquarters in a manner suitable for public access, inspection and photocopying.
. subject to confidentiality provisions of the Agreement and of the guidelines, the file will contain...
any other information considered by the Secretariat under Article 15(4) of the Agreement.").
213. NAC Letter of Advice, supra note 145 (quoting letter that Norine Smith, Assistant Deputy
Minister, Environment Canada sent to the Chair of NAC Canada on May 11, 1999). Along the same
lines, Knox reports that "Canada had opposed Secretariat requests to have joint meetings with a panel of
experts, the submitters, and officials from the governments of Canada and British Columbia, and had
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in part, as discussed in the preceding section, by Canada's apparent desire to
avoid being forced publicly to disclose sensitive or embarrassing information.
Canada's reluctance also appears to be motivated by another
consideration: the potential that a "public" factual record preparation process
will shine an unwanted spotlight on the allegations being investigated. Canada
claims that this is an undesirable result that undermines the "integrity of the
Council's decision on whether or not to make the final factual record
public. ' 21 4 This is because, according to Canada, such a process encourages
"the public, submitters, governments, and other stakeholders to draw
conclusions on, or debate the merits of, the assertions that are the subject of
the factual record" before the Council decides whether to make the record
public.215 In the run-up to the Dallas meeting, this concern had crystallized
into a proposal that the Council appoint a working group to oversee the
manner in which the Secretariat carried out its factual record preparation
duties.
Canada's apparent aversion to the spotlight is somewhat paradoxical in
that it is precisely this spotlighting attribute that many observers suggest is
216among the CEC's most useful and important functions. It would also appear
to be inconsistent with Article 1(h) of the NAAEC, which underscores that an
objective of the Agreement is to "promote transparency and public
participation in the development of environmental laws, regulations and
policies. 2 7
This paradox aside, of arguably even greater concern is a proposition
implicit in Canada's position: that the Secretariat lacks the discretion to
determine its own procedure. The NAAEC neither explicitly authorizes nor
prevents the Secretariat from embarking on the quasi-public investigative
process adopted in B.C. Hydro. Under Canadian and American domestic law,
in matters of procedure, tribunals are entitled to establish their own rules and
practices as long as they do not conflict with the objectives of the general
authority they have been granted. This approach is also consistent with the
IRC's admonition that those involved in the complaint process respect the
"discretion provided to decision-makers at different points in the process."
218
The positive developments in Dallas notwithstanding, it is fair to say
that the Parties have not heeded this admonition particularly well in the past,
and there is reason to worry that this pattern may be difficult to break. As one
longtime NAAEC observer has put it, as the caseload of the Secretariat
increases, there will be an increasing incentive "for the Parties to take control
disagreed with the Secretariat over what types of information could be made public." Knox, supra note
157, at 70 n.300.
214. Environment Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 188.
215. Id.
216. JOHNSON & BEAuLIrE, supra note 59, at 166 ("[O]ne of the CEC's most useful functions
will be to cast the spotlight on public authorities that fail to fulfill their obligations-in particular, the
obligation to effectively enforce domestic environmental laws. These NAAEC provisions constitute a
formal and permanent instrument enabling NGOs to direct the spotlight themselves."). See also
Independent Review Committee, supra note 123, at 5 (noting that the complaint process serves as "some
350 million pairs of eyes to alert the Council of any 'race to the bottom'); Markell, supra note 141, at
572 n.131 (discussing the increasing popularity of "spotlighting" strategies).
217. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 1(h).
218. Independent Review Committee, supra note 123, at 22.
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of the procedure away from the Secretariat by micromanaging the
Secretariat's discretion in considering submissions and preparing factual
records. 2 19 This observation appears particularly prescient given important
developments that occurred as this Article went to press.
In late November 2001, the Council voted to proceed with factual
records in five cases recommended by the Secretariat. In four of these cases,
however, the Council imposed restrictions on the scope of the factual records,
declining to follow the Secretariat's recommendations to approve broader
reviews. In all of these cases (three involving Canada and one involving the
United States), the Secretariat had recommended factual records that would
have examined broad governmental environmental enforcement patterns and
practices. In relation to the three submissions involving Canada (Oldman
River H1, B.C. Mining, and B.C. Logging), the Council restricted the
Secretariat's factual inquiry to single episodes of alleged non-enforcement. In
relation to the submission involving the United States (involving alleged non-
enforcement of the Migratory Birds Treaty), it limited scope of the inquiry to
two specific violations of the treaty cited by the submitters. In all four cases,
the Council also required the Secretariat to provide the Parties with
"workplans" with respect to preparation of the proposed factual records, a
requirement that was not imposed when approving factual records in earlier
cases.
221
The U.S. government's own advisory committee (the "GAC") was
bluntly critical after learning, prior to the Council meeting, that the U.S.
Council representative intended to vote for a factual record in the Migratory
Birds case only on the condition that scope of the record be limited to "two
anecdotal violations identified in the submission." 222 The GAC claimed that
this "partial-yes" position with respect to the "first submission requiring a
substantive response from our federal government" would "eviscerate" the
independence of the Secretariat by denying it the latitude it has thus far
exercised to define the scope of the factual record.223
The GAC also expressed concern about reports that the U.S.
representative intended to insist on the right to approve the factual record
workplan22 4 (a proposal which appears to have evolved into the new
requirement that the Secretariat prepare factual record workplans for the
Parties' review and comments). The GAC states:
[This proposal] undermines the submission process in the same manner that was
previously attempted by other Parties in the endless negotiations that occurred regarding
the [submission] Guidelines. .... There the ultimate goal was to curtail the Secretariat's
independence and limit the transparency of the process. Ironically, in those
circumstances, the U.S. successfully championed the Secretariat's independence by
219. Knox, supra note 167, at 9.
220. CEC Council Votes on Five Factual Record Recommendations, CEC News (October 19,
2001), available at http://www.cec.org.
221. Id.; see also Council Resolutions, available at http://www.cec.org (last visited Dec. 20,
2001).
222. Letter of Advice to the EPA Administrator Christine Whitman from the Chair of the
Governmental Advisory Committee to the U.S. Representative to the CEC (October 19, 2001), at 2.
223. Id. at 1-2.
224. Id. at 2 (suggesting that "if the Secretariat's independence is undercut in the manner
proposed by the U.S., there will be no future credibility to the submission process").
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thwarting those Guideline changes and creating a process, with the JPAC's involvement,
to set the process on the correct course. By its current approach, the U.S. would
fundamentally reverse the progressive steps that have been made in this area.
225
Not unexpectedly the Council's recent factual record decisions have provoked
a strong reaction from within the environmental movement. Leading Canadian
environmentalist Dr. Martha Kostuch predicts that the decisions will
substantially increase opposition to trade liberalization: "I think any
environmentalist, in light of (these decisions], would have to totally oppose
any expansion of free trade." 26
c. The Authority of the Secretariat to Interpret and Apply the
NAAEC
A final area of controversy has concerned the scope of the Secretariat's
authority to interpret the NAAEC and the submission Guidelines. Neither the
Agreement nor the Guidelines specifically elaborate the Secretariat's authority
in this regard, particularly in a situation where a Party disagrees with the
interpretation adopted by the Secretariat, as occurred in B.C. Hydro.
Two principles provide a starting point for considering this question.
First of all, under the tripartite relationship contemplated by the NAAEC, the
Secretariat answers to the Council, not to the Parties. Thus, for example, if a
Party is concerned about a request for information made by the Secretariat
during preparation of a factual record, the Party is instructed to raise the issue
with the Council. If the Council decides the Party's concern is well founded,
by a two-thirds vote the Council may issue a binding directive to the
Secretariat. Secondly, it is the job of the Council to address "questions and
differences that may arise between the Parties regarding the interpretation or
application of this Agreement" (emphasis added).227 The NAAEC specifically
forbids the Parties from seeking to influence or direct the actions of the
Secretariat.
228
In the lead-up to the Dallas meetings, it came to light that the Council
was considering several proposals aimed at limiting the authority of the
Secretariat to interpret and apply the Agreement. One proposal would have
required the Secretariat to seek direction from the Council, even if no Party
had raised an objection, whenever it "encountered an issue of
interpretation."229 The Council was also asked to consider imposing a
requirement that the Secretariat halt its work and seek a Council ruling
whenever a disagreement arose between the Secretariat and a Party in the
interpretation or application of the NAAEC. 230
The former proposal as drafted is clearly unworkable. Dealing with
issues of interpretation is a central and inescapable feature of the Secretariat's
current mandate. It is responsible for making interpretive judgments on a
225. Id. at 3.
226. Martin Mittelstaedt, Environment Watchdog Limited Complaints on Pollution-Law
Enforcement: Fail to Rin full NAFTA Probe, Vexing Critics, GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 21, 2001, at A-13.
227. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 10(1)(d).
228. See NAC Letter of Advice, supra note 187 (discussing Article 11(4)).
229. Environment Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 188.
230. Id.
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broad range of questions.231 With well over a dozen complaints on its docket
at any one time, imposing on the Secretariat an obligation to seek routinely the
advice of the Council whenever it encounters an interpretive issue presents
obvious logistical difficulties. Logistics aside, such a proposal would have a
seriously detrimental impact on the Secretariat's independence and perceived
legitimacy. The obvious danger with the second proposal is that it could be
used by a Party as a delaying tactic, seriously impairing the ability of the
Secretariat to process submissions in a timely and efficient manner.
At the Dallas meeting, the Council decided against issuing specific
guidelines that would govern when a disagreement arose between a Party and
the Secretariat. Instead, it opted to create a formal "troubleshooting" role for
the JPAC in such situations. As a result, the Dallas resolution invites "any
Party, the Secretariat, members of the public, or the JPAC itself' to bring
issues of "implementation and elaboration" relating to the submission process
to the Council.232 On receipt, the Council may refer the matter to the JPAC
which, in turn, is empowered to "conduct a public review to provide advice to
the Council as to how those issues might be addressed. ',2 3 Significantly, the
resolution provides that pending the completion of such a process, the
Secretariat is mandated to continue processing any pending submissions.
IV. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The investor claim and citizen submission processes are strikingly
similar yet, at the same time, remarkably distinct. Both are experiments in
transnational governance that create new roles for non-state actors whose
interests have traditionally been represented in international fora by their
home governments. Moreover, while both processes are still in their infancy,
they have already provoked considerable concern and defensiveness on the
part these same governments. This discomfort appears to be due in part to the
inevitable interpretive uncertainty surrounding key legal concepts at the core
of these processes. But it arises as well from the perception that these
processes have the potential to affect Westphalian sovereignty in
unanticipated ways.
In intent and design, these processes could not be less alike. Securing
Mexican agreement to an investor-state claim process was a key goal for the
American and, to a lesser extent, Canadian negotiators. Available evidence
strongly suggests that NAFTA Parties perceived Chapter 11 as the logical and
necessary extension of the trade liberalization agenda. When faced with
criticisms about the potentially constraining impact of NAFTA on domestic
231. These include: whether the complaint relates to an "environmental law;" whether it alleges
a failure "to effectively enforce" such a law; whether a complaint meets the six listed threshold criteria
under Article 14(1); whether the complaint merits a response from a Party with regard to the four criteria
listed in Article 14(2); and whether the complaint justifies a recommendation that a factual record be
prepared under Article 15.1. NAAEC, supra note 3, art. 14-15.




policy, the Parties have responded by, as duly elected governments, invoking
their sovereign representative status on the international stage.
In contrast, the Parties did not originally contemplate that the arrival of
NAFTA would herald a new role for civil society. Only when it became
apparent that the development of labor and environmental side agreements
were necessary to ensure political and legislative support for NAFTA were the
Parties spurred to action. In so doing, they were careful to ensure that these
agreements left their Westphalian sovereignty intact.
This imperative is clearly reflected in the design of the citizen
submission process. Legislative choices with respect to determining domestic
environmental priorities and standards are fully immunized from review.
Complainants are confronted with a veritable steeplechase of procedural pre-
conditions.236 The Secretariat is denied the authority to reach legal
conclusions or make recommendations as part of the factual record process.
Parties retain broad powers to refuse to produce documents and to invoke
open-ended confidentiality claims over relevant information. Moreover, the
Council (with the Party against whom the allegations are being made
exercising full voting rights) is empowered to overrule, by a majority, a
Secretariat recommendation to prepare a factual record, and to decline to
publish a record that has been prepared. Finally, as we have recently
witnessed, the Council retains the authority to define how factual records are
prepared.
Westphalian sovereignty concerns played a decidedly more modest role
in the design of the investor claim process. Indeed, various features of the
regime suggest that the paramount and overriding goal of Chapter 11 is to
create a powerful, private, market-based vehicle to ensure that governments
eschew measures that might be construed as restricting foreign investment. By
virtue of the definition of "measure," any government policy, decision or law
can trigger a claim for compensation. Governments can even be required to
pay compensation with respect to non-discriminatory measures taken for a
bona fide public purpose. Claimants elect the forum in which their claim is
heard, and are entitled to appoint a member of the adjudicative panel, whose
decisions are final and binding.
Despite the careful and largely successful efforts by the Parties to
circumscribe the impact of the citizen submission process on Westphalian
sovereignty, intriguingly some of the Parties-initially Mexico, more recently
Canada and the United States-still consider the process too robust. As a
result, there have been ongoing efforts to circumscribe the mandate and
discretion of the Secretariat. Canada has also led the way in voicing concerns
235. See infra text accompanying note 10; Soloway, supra note 32, at 113 ('For the Mexican
government, the promise to protect foreign investors was not viewed as a policy constraint. Rather it was
viewed as an opportunity to make a 'credible commitment' in order to attract desperately needed foreign
capital for infrastructure development.").
236. See JOHNSON & BEAuLIEU, supra note 59, at 153 ("The steeplechase will unfold as
follows for complainants: (1) establishing that the submission is of the right kind; (2) persuading the
Secretariat to request an explanation from the party; (3) following the explanation, getting the
Secretariat to still recommend the establishment of a 'factual record;' (4) bringing the Council to
approve such recommendation with a two-thirds majority; (5) hoping that the Council will allow the
publication of the completed 'factual record."').
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about the textual uncertainty surrounding the meaning of key terminology in
Chapter 11. Only recently, however, have we seen evidence that Canada's
NAFTA partners share these concerns.
The prospect that civil society organizations may soon be able to
participate in Chapter 11 proceedings also offers some basis for guarded
optimism that future arbitral decisions will be attuned to the broader public
policy implications of the decisions they are called upon to make. But while
the significance of opening the door for civil society to participate in the
Chapter 11 process should not be minimized, a larger challenge awaits. While
a participatory revolution may have occurred in international environmental
law, so far it has spread slowly to the realm of trade and investment. Indeed
many commentators have argued that one of the lessons of the historic
showdown in Seattle is that governments have for too long compartmentalized
the trade liberalization agenda, marginalizing concerns about non-trade
interests and ignoring the non-economic impacts of globalization. 237 An
institutional illustration of this phenomenon in the NAFTA context is the
regrettable lack of interaction between the NAFTA Free Trade Commission
and the CEC despite the exhortation in Article 10(6) of the NAAEC for these
institutions to collaborate around trade and environment issues.238
A central reason governments have resisted integrating civil society
organizations into Chapter 11 processes is the same concern that has
bedeviled the citizen submission process: a protectionist approach to
sovereignty. The argument implicit throughout much of this Article is that this
protectionist stance in relation to civil society is anomalous and unjustified,
particularly in light of the far more pressing and substantial threats to
sovereignty posed by the parallel investor claim process. Moreover, I would
argue that this protectionist posture might, paradoxically, ultimately serve to
constrain the ability of states to successfully pursue their trade and investment
liberalization agendas. In this regard it is instructive to consider the record of
expanding NGO involvement in international environmental law in the last
decade or so. A strong argument can be made that the participatory revolution
that has occurred in this context has actually enhanced state sovereignty by
providing support and legitimacy for the expansion of state regulation
internationally into a variety of new global subject matters.239 There is no
reason, in principle, why a similar engagement with civil society would not
237. See, e.g., Pierre-Marc Johnson & Andr6 Beaulieu, The Road to a Better World, GLOBE
AND MAIL, Dec. 30, 1999, at A15.
238. Cooperation between these NAFTA trade and environment institutions is specifically
mandated by Article 10(6) of the NAAEC but has yet to occur. For further discussion, see Howard
Mann, NAFTA and the Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 399-400 (2000).
239. See Kal Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environmental Law,
21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 585 (1997) ("[W]hile strengthening the roles of NGOs, this
transformation simultaneously strengthens and legitimizes the joint and coordinated arrogation of new
state powers through the creation of new public international law."). For an earlier iteration of this
theory see Elizabeth Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the
Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 546-47 (1991). The theory that states secure "new powers"
through engagement with civil society at the international level is evocative of the Chayes' contention
that the realization of state sovereignty increasingly depends on external engagement. Chayes, supra
note 17, at 27 ("[IUn today's setting, the only way most states can realize and express their sovereignty is
through participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the international system.").
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yield analogous benefits when trade and investment liberalization initiatives
collide with domestic health and environmental priorities.
One legacy of the failure of states to engage with civil society is the
public perception that the inevitable price of trade and investment
liberalization is diminished national sovereignty with respect to the protection
of public health and the environment, and the stewardship management of
natural resources. If states remain committed to the trade and investment
liberalization agenda, they must confront this perception by responding
directly to public concerns, expressed and inchoate, about the sovereignty
implications of the agenda in these realms.
A key challenge on the horizon is the Free Trade Area of the Americas
("FTAA") agreement. Thirty-four states in the American hemisphere have
committed to concluding FTAA negotiations by the year 2005.240 As yet,
however, there is little or no indication whether or to what extent the FTAA
will address environmental or other civil society concerns.24' Meanwhile, a
broad coalition of U.S.-based environmental advocacy organizations has gone
on the offensive.242 Dissatisfied with the failure of the NAFTA regime
affirmatively to recognize the right of governments to protect public health
and the environment, the coalition has published a set of principles that it
argues "should inform all aspects of U.S. trade policy."243 These principles of
"environmentally responsible trade" include ensuring that trade agreements
(1) do not weaken national or international health or environmental standards
(2) encourage environmental progress and discourage harmful environmental
impacts; and (3) are developed and implemented through open and democratic
processes. 244
Among other things, the Coalition's statement calls for clear
"environmental exceptions" to trade and investment rules for laws and
regulations that protect public health, the environment and natural resources.
It also seeks to impose, under all new trade agreements, an obligation on
states to effectively enforce environmental laws and regulations and to refrain
from lowering environmental standards to gain trade advantages; an
obligation, it argues, that should be subject to the same dispute settlement and
enforcement mechanisms that otherwise apply under such agreements.245
It is unlikely that states will immediately embrace the idea that they
must engage with civil society around trade and environment issues in order to
maintain and enhance their sovereignty in the global economy. Indeed, the
NAFTA governments appear to perceive no contradiction, in sovereignty
240. See TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS (Jos6 M. Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse
Roberts eds., 2001).
241. The draft text of the FTAA is available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/ftaa-neg-
e.asp.
242. The members of this Coalition are: the American Lands Alliance, the Center for
International Environmental Law, the Consumer's Choice Council, the Defenders of Wildlife,
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy,
National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Pacific Environment, Sierra Club and
World Wildlife Fund.
243. COALmON FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE TRADE, PRINCIPLES FOR
ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE TRADE (2001).
244. Id. at l, 2.
245. Id.
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terms, in pursuing a highly liberalized policy with respect to foreign investors
while simultaneously adopting a protectionist posture in dealings with civil
society. It is hoped that this Article demonstrates why the existence of this
asymmetry and the challenges it poses are of much more than passing
academic interest.
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APPENDIX I: CLAIMS UNDERNAFTA CHAPTER 11
Claimant Respondent Subject Matter; Measure Commencement/ Outcome
Challenged Current Status
1. Halchette Mexico Unknown 1995 Abandoned
Distribution Services
(unknown)
2. Signa S.A. Canada Pharmaceutical regulations 1995-1996 Claim abandoned; domestic
(Mexico) that restricted access to court struck down
Canadian market for new legislation that formed the
drug basis of the claim
3. Ethyl Corp. Canada Importation ban on fuel 1996-1998 Pre-hearing settlement
(U.S.A.) additive MMT reached in July, 1998 for
$12.5 million (U.S.)
4. Metalclad Mexico Hazardous waste facility 1997-ongoing Final Award for claimant
Corporation denied state and local Aug. 25, 2000 ($16.685
(U.S.A.) operating permits; area that million U.S. in damages);
facility operated in rezoned award set aside in part by
as ecological reserve the British Columbia
Supreme Court May 2,
2001; appeal pending
5. Robert Azinian, Mexico Cancellation of waste 1997-1999 Claim dismissed Oct. 18,
Kenneth Davitian, disposal contract 1999 without costs to either
and Ellen Bace side
(U.S.A.)
6. Waste Mexico Cancellation of a waste 1998-2000 Final Award (dismissed on
Management, Inc. disposal contract jurisdictional grounds) on
No.1 May 26, 2000
(U.S.A.)
7. S.D. Myers, Inc. Canada Ban on the export of PCB 1998-ongoing Award for claimant in
(U.S.A.) waste reasons rendered on Nov.
13, 2000: quantification of
damages pending;,
application to set aside filed
in Federal Court of Canada
8. Pope & Talbot, Canada Softwood lumber export 1998-ongoing Interim (Phase 1) ruling
Inc. quota allocation dismissing several aspects
(U.S.A.) of claim made June 26,
2000; final (Phase B1) award
finding for claimant only
under the Verification
Review Episode of Art.
1105 rendered April 10,
2001; quantification of
damages pending
9. SunBelt Canada Ban on bulk water exports 1998-ongoing Claim in progress
(U.S.A.) from province
10. Marvin Ray Mexico Lost profits due to denial 1998-ongaing Claim in progress
Feldman Karpa of tax rebates on cigarette
(U.S.A.) excise tax
11. The Loewen United Allegation that slate trial 1998-ongoing Claim in progress
Group, Inc., and States process involving suit
Raymond L. Loewen against claimant over a
(Canada) funeral home transaction





foreigners;, and Art. 1110,
prohibiting uncompensated
ex'propriation
88 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 27:141
CLAIMS UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11 (CONT.)
12. Methanex United Announced ban on use of 1998-ongoing Claim in progress;
Corporation States fuel additive MT3E in decision on amicus
(Canada) California application rendered
Jan. 15, 2001
13. Mondev United Allegation that 1999-ongoing Claim in progress
International Ltd. States Massachusetts Torts Claims
(Canada) Act and errors made by state
trial court in civil litigation
over a real estate
development
14. ADF Group Inc. United Challenge to "Buy 2000-ongoing Claim in progress
(Canada) States American" government
procurement policy by
Canadian steel fabricator
15. United Parcel Canada Crown Corporation alleged to 2000-ongoing Claim in progress
Service, Inc. be unfairly competing with
(U.S.A.) claimant in parcel delivery
16. Waste Mexico Same grounds as Waste Refiled in 2000- Claim in progress
Management Inc. Management No. I ongoing
(No. 2)
(U.S.A.)
17. Ketchum Canada Similar to Pope and Talbot; Withdrawn
Investments and Tysa challenge to softwood lumber 2000-2001
Investments export allocation
(U.S.A.)
18. Trammel Crow Canada Similar to UPS claim; 2001-ongoing Notice of intent filed; in
Company challenge to state monopoly progress
(U.S.A.) over first class postal services
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APPENDIX II: SUBMISSIONS UNDERNAAEC ARTICLES 14 & 15
Submitter/ Party Subject Matter Date of Status Outcome
Registry number/ Filing
Case "Name"
1. Biodiversity Legal United States Non-enforcement of June 30 Terminated under
Foundation Endangered Species Act 1995 Art14(2) on Dec. 11,
SEM-95-001 with respect to spotted 1995
(Spotted Owl) owl protection due to a
military readiness rider
2. Sierra Club et al United States Non-enforcement of Aug. 30 Terminated under
SEM-95-002 environmental laws due 1995 Art. 14(2) on Dec. 8,
(Logging Rider) to disaster relief rider 1995
3. Comite pars la Proteccion Mexico Failure to comply with Jan. 18 Final Factual Record
de los Recursos Naturales, environmental 1996 released on October 24,
A.C. et al. assessment requirements 1997
SEM-96-001 in authorizing pier
(Cozumel Pier) construction at Cozumel
4. Aage Tottrp Canada Non-enforcement of Mar. 20 Terminated under Art.
SEM-96-002 environmental laws 1996 14(2) on May 28, 1996
resulting in pollution of
wetlands in fish and bird
habitat
5. The Friends of the Oldman Canada Failure to apply, comply Sept. 9 Terminated under
River with and enforce habitat 1996 Art.15(1) on April 2,
SEM-96-003 protection sections of 1997
(Oldman River 1) fisheries and
environmental
assessment Acts
6. The Southwest Center for United States Non-enforcement of Nov. 14 Submission withdrawn
Biological Diversity et al National Environmental 1996 on June 5, 1997
SEM-96-004 Policy Act in relation to
(Fort Huachuca) U.S. Army operations
7. Comitc pro Limpieza del Mexico Discharge of wastewater Mar. 15 Secretariat awaiting,
Rio Magdalena into Magdalena River in 1997 under Art.21(1)(b),
SEM-97-002 violation of additional information
(Rio Magdelana) environmental from Party
legislation
8. B.C. Aboriginal Fisheries Canada Non-enforcement of April 02 Factual Record released
Commission et al. Fisheries Act against 1997 on June 11, 2000
SEM-97-001 B.C. Hydro
(B.C. Hydro)
9. Centre quebecois du droit Canada Non-enforcement of April 09 Council tamed down
de l'environnement several environmental 1997 Secretariat's
SEM-97-003 standards relating to hog recommendation to
(Quebec Hog farms) production prepare factual record
on May 16,2000
10. Canadian Environmental Canada Non-enforcement of May 26 Terminated under




11. Animal Alliance of Canada Non-enforcement of July 21 Terminated under
Canada etal regulation ratifying Rio 1997 Art.14(1) on May 26,
SEM-97-005 Earth Summit on 1998
(Biodiversity) Biological Diversity
12. The Friends ofthe Canada Failure to apply, comply Oct. 4 Factual record ordered
Oldman River with and enforce habitat 1997 by Council (November
SEM-97-006 protection provisions in 16,2001) on more
(Oldman River H) federal fisheries and limited basis than
environmental recommended by
assessment legislation Secretariat.
13. Instituto de Derecho Mexico Non-enforcement of Oct. 10 Terminated under
Ambiental environment law in 1997 Art. 15(1) on July 14,
SEM-97-007 counection with citizen 2000
(Lake Chapala) complaint of degradation
of river-lake basin
2002]
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SUBMISSIONS UNDER NAAEC ARTICLES 14 & 15 (CONT.)
14. Instituto de Derecho Mexico Failure to enforce Jan. 09 Terminated under 14(1)
Ambiental, A.C., et al. General Law on 1998 on January 11, 2000
SEM-98-001 Ecological Balance and
(Guadalajara) Environmental
Protection in relation to
explosions in
Guadalajara
15. Hector Gregorio Ortiz Mexico Improper administrative Oct. 14 Terminated under
Martinez processing and persistent 1997 Art,14(1) on
SEM-98-002 failure to enforce March 18, 1999
environment law in
connection with a citizen
complaint
16. Department of the Planet United States Non-enforcement of May 27 Terminated under
Earth Great Lakes Water 1998 Art.15(l) on October 5,
SEM-98-003 Quality Agreement 2001
(Great Lakes)
17. Sierra Club of B.C. et al Canada Systematic failure to June 29 Factual record ordered
SEM-98-004 enforce Fisheries Act 1998 by Council (November
(B.C. Mining) provision against mining 16, 2001) on more
industry limited basis than
recommended by
Secretariat
18. Academia Sonorense de Mexico Improper authorization Aug. 11 Terminated under Art
Derechos Humanosz et al. of a hazardous waste 1998 15(1) on October 26,
SEM-98-005 landfill (Cytrar) 2000
(Cytrar 1)
19. Gmpo Ecologico Mexico Non-enforcement of Oct. 20 Factual record ordered
Manglar A.C. environmental laws with 1998 by Council (November
SEM-98-006 respect to the Aquanova 16, 2001) on terms
(Aquanova) shrimp farm recommended by
Secretariat
20. Environmental Health Mexico Failure to enforce laws Oct. 23 Factual record in
Coalition, et. al regarding lead smelter 1998 process following
SEM-98-007 posing serious threats to Council's decision on
(Metales human health and May 16,2000
y Derivados) environment
21. Methanex Corporation United States Failure to enforce Oct. 18 Terminated
SEM-99-001 California laws related to 1999 under Art. 14(3) on June
water resource protection 30, 2000
and regulation of (see Neste)
underground storage
tanks
22. Alliance for the Wild United States Non-enforcement of Nov. 19 Factual record ordered
Rockies, et al. Migratory Bird Treaty 1999 by Council (November
SEM-99-002 Act prohibition against 16, 2001) on more
(migratory birds) killing birds without a limited basis than
permit recommended by
Secretariat.
23. Neste Canada United States Failure to enforce Jan. 21 Terminated under
SEM-00-002 California laws related to 2000 Art.14(3) on June 30,




24. Rosa Maria Escalante de Mexico Molymex plant pollution Jan. 27 Terminated under
Fernandez violating air quality and 2000 Art. 14(1) on April 25,
SEM-00-001 environmental health 2000
(Molymex I) standards
25. Hudson River Audubon United States Non-enforcement of Mar. 02 Terminated under
Society of Westchester Inc. et Migratory Bird Treaty 2000 Art.14(1) on April 12,
al. Act and Endangered 2000
SEM-00-003 Species Act
(Jamaica Bay)
26. David Suzuki Foundation Canada Breach of commitments Mar. 15 Factual record ordered
et al. under NAAEC to 2000 by Council (November
SEM-00-004 effectively enforce laws 16, 2001) on more




SUBMISSIONS UNDERNAAEC ARTICLES 14 & 15 (CONT.)
27. Academia Sonorense de Mexico Non-enforcement of April 06 Secretariat considering
Derechos Humanos and General Law of 2000 under Art. 15 whether to
Domingo Gutierrez Mendivil Ecological Equilibrium recommend preparation
SEM-00-005 and Environmental of factual record
(Molymex H) Protection against
Molymex Co.
28. Comision de Solidaridad Mexico Denying access to June 09 Secretariat considering
y Defensa de los Derechos environmental justice to 2000 whether application
Humanos A. C. Indigenous communities satisfies requirements
SEM-00-006 in the Sierra Tarahumara of ArtL14
(Tarahumara) in the State of Chihuahua _
29. Academia Sonorens de Mexico Failure to effectively Feb. 14 Secretariat considering
Derechos Humanos A.C., enforce environmental 2001 under Art. 15 whether to
et al. laws in relation to Cytrar recommend preparation
SEM-01-001 hazardous waste landfill of factual record
(Cytrar I1)
30. Names withheld by Canada Failing to enforce April 12 Dismissed under Art
Secretariat under Art. 11(8) NAAEC obligations by 2001 14(1) on May 25, 2001
SEM-01-002 failure to prevent




3 1. Mercerizados y Tenidos Mexico Mexican company June 14 Dismissed under Art.
de Guadalajara, S.A. alleges that Mexican 2001 14(1) on September 19,
SEM-01-003 courts failed to take 2001.




(Dermet) in the context
of a civil action
2002]

